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ABSTRACT
EDUCATION FOR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT
September 1977
Peter F. Mullen A.B. St. John's Seminary
S.T.L. Gregorian University, Rome, M.A. Assumption College
Ed. D. University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Ellis Olim
The writer examines and critiques the cognitive-developmental
theory of moral growth with a view to translating it into a theory of
spiritual development. The moral development approaches of Piaget and
Kohlberg are examined in detail and are found to be theoretically
elegant but biased in their almost exclusive reliance on the cognitive
domain to explain moral behavior. It is suggested that moral theorists
might fruitfully look at the findings of depth psychologists such as
Carl Jung and Erick Neumann whose investigations of the unconscious
offer an affective complement to Piaget and Kohlberg' s cognitive
orientation particularly in explaining discrepancies between moral
thinking and behavior.
Spirituality is defined as the domain of ultimate meaning and
value as perceived by individuals and around which they attempt
to
orient their lives. The writer suggests that there are
spiritual
iv
Vstages parallel to Kohlberg’s moral stages whereby individuals define
the meaning of their intuitive spiritual experiences in personal and
social terms. The lack of spiritual stage development has probably
caused many sublime spiritual experiences to be translated into
repressive social correlates.
Finally the writer examines several different moral education
endeavors including his own, most of which have a cognitive develop-
mental or humanistic orientation, and outlines a teacher-training
program designed to educate teachers adept at facilitating both moral
and spiritual development.
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INTRODUCTION
The following paper is written from the philosophical
perspective which considers education to be a special kind of
human interaction, which, however structured, has as its goal
human growth and development. In recent years Piaget and Kohlberg
have proposed psychological theories of cognitive and moral
development which have stimulated an increasingly large body of
research. Their theories have also inspired educators to apply
their developmental insights to the educational process. In the
realm of moral education, which is one of the principal foci of
this paper, a wide variety of curricula, designed from the develop-
mental viewpoint, are becoming available. Curriculum research and
design has, in turn, led to an examination of the atmosphere of the
school in which the curriculum is taught. Kohlberg (1972) is of the
opinion that this atmosphere exercises an overriding influence on
the developmental progress of students. The structures that define
administrative, teacher and student roles, relationships and attitudes
can powerfully reinforce the developmental orientation of a given
curriculum or virtually cancel it out.
And so the purview of developmental education continues to
broaden. New findings suggest further questions and still newer
areas
to research. The first purpose of this paper is to examine
the
research into the psychology of moral development (Chapter II)
and
1
2some of the educational applications stimulated by it (Chapter IV) in
an open-ended and sometimes critical way. It is open-ended because
I suspect that developmental psychology is just getting its legs under
itself and that educators have scarcely begun to explore its relevance
to their own discipline.
It is critical because of a tendency in the cognitive-develop-
mental approach of Kohlberg to pass over important contributions of
other psychological schools to the understanding of the developing
moral agent. Kohlberg' s theory, which focuses on the cognitive aspects
of moral judgment, has a theoretical elegance about it that is hard to
resist. Emotional and other non-rational motivating factors, on the
other hand, tend to be opaque, resistant to human understanding in both
practice and theory. The temptation, therefore, is to work with clear
and distinct conceptualizations rather than with the amorphous and
indistinct realm of the non-rational which escapes easy categorization.
I think the cognitive developmental school in general tends to fall
prey to this temptation and that this is reflected in curricula
inspired by them.
own ventures into moral curriculum development have included
the uses of techniques derived from Gestalt Therapy and other human-
istic psychologies to enable learners to tap the more intuitive snd
affective aspects of their personality which constitute the ground of
their moral thinking and action (Chapter IV). At the same time,
however, I have utilized Kohlberg' s stage theory as an organizing
framework lest moral dialogue degenerate into the exchange of
mutually
irreconcilable opinions.
3The second purpose of this paper is to use research into moral
development as a point of departure to speculate about possible
developmental features in the religious or spiritual realm. Kohlberg
has raised the issue himself (Kohlberg, 1971, 1973) in his speculations
about a meta-ethical stage 7, as has the theologian Fowler (1973)
working in concert with Kohlberg. Kohlberg suggests that in the
experience of meaninglessness and despair brought on by confronting the
reality of death, rational moral codes and commitments crumble. When
the fundamental meaning of life is questioned, so inevitably is a
morality based on reason alone. In terms reminiscent of Gestalt
psychology, Kohlberg sees the solution to such a dilemma in an experi-
ential shift from figure to ground. At such a moment (often but not
always during a mystical or peak experience) our ego-perspective
(figure) is replaced by a cosmic perspective (ground) . We perceive
and value life from the cosmic or infinite perspective rather than
from our customary, finite viewpoint. Supposedly we experience meaning
at a deeper (or higher, Stage 7, level) which, in turn validates our
commitment to purposive and moral action.
Whatever the validity of Kohlberg' s philosophic speculations,
his comments raise the issue of whether one can integrate often highly
subjective and essentially incommunicable intuitive experiences into a
universal, developmental framework. It also raises the questions of
how does one's basic meaning and value orientation in the world relate
to one's moral stance. I attempt to deal with some of these
issues in
Chapter III.
Finally, I propose the tentative outlines of a curriculum
for
4teachers (Chapter V) in which I attempt to integrate the cognitive-
developmental approach to moral education with other psychologies more
oriented to affective and unconscious motivations. In addition there
are modules which raise some of the philosophic issues considered in
Chapter III concerning meaning and morality. The orientation of the
curriculum is to encourage students to trust and use their own experi-
ence. Exercises are designed to broaden their awareness and cognitive
constructs to assist them to organize their experience into meaningful
patterns.
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
Moral education in some form or other has been part of the
human enterprise from the very beginning. As long as people have
associated together in groups, certain norms have governed their
relationships with each other and the world and this, in turn, has
necessitated teaching these norms to new members of the group.
Naturally what was taught and how has varied as greatly as the many
forms of society which have evolved all over the planet.
Although the teaching of morality has been a conscious under-
taking of humankind for many centuries, it has only recently become a
self conscious preoccupation. With the greater differentiation of
human consciousness and the development of more and more specialties
and competencies of knowledge, educators have turned increasingly not
only to philosophers, theologians and religious authorities for guid-
ance but also to psychologists and sociologists. The increased social
scientific emphasis has focused attention more on the process of moral
education and less on what was to be taught. The distinction between
the process of moral education and its content is relatively recent
but crucial to understanding the current state of the art. Process
pays attention to how the learner learns both with regard to what
happens within (intra-psychically) as he or she receives and organizes
5
6information, and what happens without in the learning environment,
that is how social and ecological conditions, teaching strategies,
techniques, etc., facilitate or hinder moral growth. The content of
moral education are the attitudes, values and moral judgments which
a learner assimilates or develops. While these are commonly
expressed as axioms or commandments, e.g., 1 it is better to give than
to receive,' 'thou shalt not kill,' they are not always so easily
articulated nor immediately applicable to a given situation. For
example, an increased respect for human life or a greater sensitivity
and responsiveness to inequities in the social system need not be
reducible to concise adages but nevertheless represent genuine moral
growth.
There are nearly as many differences of opinion concerning
the process of moral education as there are about what ought to be
taught. Several attempts have been made to arrange the various
approaches schematically. Kohlberg (1964) categorizes the literature
he reviewed according to the importance researchers give to behavior,
emotions, or moral judgment, respectively. Later, however, he and
Mayer (1972) suggest that general educational approaches, including
moral education can be categorized according to three underlying psy-
chological and philosophic positions: 1) the romantic position
represented by Freud, Gesell and A. S. Neill's Summerhill ; 2) cul-
tural transmission derived from the classic academic tradition of
Western education, and 3) progressivism , represented by Dewey, and
more recently modified by Piaget and Kohlberg himself as the cognitive-
y
developmental approach.
7According to Kohlberg and Mayer, adherents of the romantic
approach view human development through the metaphor of organic
growth. Mental development unfolds according to prepatterned, geneti-
cally determined stages. The environment provides little more than
nourishment for that growth. Emotional and moral development also
evolve through hereditary stages, such as the Freudian psychosexual
stages, but remain independent of cognitive development. The latter
depends on knowledge of the social world; the former is a biological
given which, unless frustrated and fixated by the environment, unfolds
of its own accord.
The cultural transmission model views the development of the
mind through the metaphor of the machine. The environment imprints
relatively unprocessed input or data directly on the mind where they
are accumulated and elicited by an appropriate stimulus or emitted
under appropriate stimulus conditions. Learning is defined in terms
of specific responses or behaviors which can be shaped by reward,
praise or feedback. Educational systems as apparently disparate as
the United States and Soviet public schools and the Catholic parochial
schools (at least those uninfluenced by the Church reforms begun in the
mid-1960»s) rely heavily on the cultural transmission model. This
model seems especially congenial to the educational techniques derived
from behaviorism and social learning theory.
The progressive or cognitive developmental metaphor is not
material but dialectical. It is analagous to a conversation or dia-
logue which consists in the confrontation of ideas and opinions with
the opposites. The consequent interaction (or as some prefer,
trans-
8action) stimulates cognitive, moral, and affective development, for
these three realms are parallel aspects of a unified structural reor-
ganization that occurs in development. (As we shall see, the cognitive
developmentalists better exemplify this structural unity in theory
than in their concrete applications.)
Referring back to Kohlberg' s (1964) earlier categorization of
education approaches, Kohlberg and Mayer assert that the cultural
transmission viewpoint emphasizes behavior
,
the romantic viewpoint
inner states and feelings and the progressive point of view coordi-
nates the two. Again I note in passing that in fact the cognitive
developmental viewpoint, at least as represented by Kohlberg and his
colleagues, in actual practice emphasizes cognitive and judgmental
skills and deals with the behavioral and affective aspects of moral
education only tangentially.
Hoffman (1970) in an extensive (99-page) review of moral
education literature, organizes his material according to a tripartite
schema somewhat different from either Kohlberg or Kohlberg and Mayer.
He asserts that there are three philosophical doctrines which bear on
both theorists' and practitioners' approaches to moral education: the
" original sin " doctrine, the " innate purity" doctrine, and the
" tabula
rasa " (blank slate) doctrine.
In psychological circles—the original sin advocates stress
the importance of early intervention by adults to protect children
from their own anarchic tendencies and to socialize them. The moral
education process is identified with teaching children to adhere to and
ultimately to internalize the norms laid down by society. The most
9characteristic modern representative of this approach in the psycho-
analytic tradition is epitomized in Bruno Bettelheim who says: "one
can live successfully and learn well in school as long as one's
growing up begins with a very firm and stringent morality based on
fear and trembling" (cited in Stewart, 1974, pp 165-166).
Hoffman's second category, derived from the doctrine of innate
purity
,
resembles Kohlberg and Mayer's romantic classification and
both ascribe it (probably wrongfully) to Jean Jacques Rousseau. Sur-
prisingly, Hoffman classifies Piaget (and by implication Kohlberg) as
the main present day representative of the innate purity approach'.
According to Hoffman, adherents of this approach believe that adult
and societal influences should be kept to a minimum during a child '
s
formative years because they are primarily corrupting. It is true
that during his early work on moral development Piaget (1965) believed
that young children, who experience adult rules as alien and heteron-
oraous, could best develop morally through interaction with their peers
only (a point on which he and Kohlberg differ) . His increasing empha-
sis on the importance of the development of role-taking perspectives,
however, implies an intense social participation at variance with a
concern for the "corrupting influences of society" characteristic of
the innate purity doctrine.
Hoffman's third category is founded on the tabula rasa doctrine
which views the human psyche as an infinitely malleable blank. In this
it resembles Kohlberg and Mayer's cultural transmission category and
both articles assign the learning theorists to this group. Hoffman,
himself a learning theorist, notes that this third category shares the
10
psychoanalyst's concern that without early adult intervention the
child's primary motivation would continue to be the gratification of
biological drives.
In terms of moral motivation Hoffman asserts that Piaget
locates it in conscious prior .judgments of rightness or wrongness;
Freudian theory in largely unconscious attempts to repress powerful
irrational forces; and learning theory in responses to extrinsic
rewards and punishments with little or no accompanying rationale.
Here again he notes an overlap among more recent learning theorists
who consider such internal motivation as altruism and consideration
for others.
A more recent attempt at organizing and making some sense out
of the mass of philosophic speculation and research data concerning
moral education is that of John Stewart (1973, 1974). He lists four
approaches to moral education.
1. Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic) .
This approach views values as absolute givens which are externally
objective and embodied or reflected in the traditions of society. The
human person is viewed either as a blank slate (tabula rasa) or
inclined toward depravity. In either case people require guidance and
their values need to be formed or inculcated try knowledgeable guardians
of tradition of the Truth (scientific, secular or religious.) External
or behavioral conformity is of paramount importance and is obtained by
a set of psychological education techniques most congenial to this
approach derive from behaviorism with its emphasis on eliciting dis-
crete, observable responses.
11
2. Cultural Relativistic (Relative Nomothetic ) . The propo-
nents of this approach, according to Stewart, believe that values ere
absolutes for a given society but relative across societies. Values
are defined by and objectively exist in a given culture but it does
not follow from this the same values would have equal validity in
another society. Like the traditional authoritative approach, the
human person is viewed either as a blank slate or inclined toward
depravity. In both cases the process of socialization is considered
of primary importance and this is accomplished more on the level of
feeling and emotions than on either the cognitive or behavioral
levels. The development of interpersonal relationships, role modeling,
and conformity to peer expectations are effective means of advancing
the socialization process. Psychoanalytic techniques, adjustment
counseling and social learning theory strategies can be used singly or
in combination to aid the process the motivating force of which is
primarily guilt or anxiety about meeting or failing to meet the stand-
ards of society.
3 . Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic ) . In reaction
to the structures of the two above mentioned approaches to morality, a
more recent viewpoint has developed which considers all values to be
of
equal validity uniquely determined as they are by each individual
from
his or her own conscience. Values are a subjective matter and there-
fore no one may legitimately judge another's values if the latter
has
truly consulted his or her own thoughts and feelings on a
given matter.
The human personality enjoys a fundamental goodness which, if
heeded,
will unfailingly incline it to make right and good
decisions. This
12
viewpoint is founded on some of the tenents of existential and human-
istic philosophies, especially insofar as they emphasize the uniqueness
of the individual, the holism of the person and the basic drive toward
self-actualization.
The educational techniques of values clarification, sensitivity
training and even some indoctrination, e.g., about the basic goodness
of human nature or one's feelings, are used in this approach. It is
unclear, however, how individual self-actualization is integrated into
community purposes and goals.
4. Organismic Structural Development Approach (Universal
Transactional ) . Like both Hoffman and Kohlberg, Stewart
saves what he considers the most adequate moral-philosophical position
(his own) to the last. Drawing heavily on Piaget and Kohlberg he
defines values as neither strictly subjective nor objective but sees
them as the outcome of a transaction between the developing organism
and its environment. Ultimately those values have universal applica-
bility because they are based on fundamental biosocial determinants
which are structurally verified everywhere. Regarding the innate
goodness or depravity of human nature, this approach maintains a neu-
tral stance although it recognizes a basic dynamism that inclines the
human personality both toward a more holistic integration within itself
and a more adequate and universal value system.
The organismic structural approach is naturally congenial to
the cognitive developmental educational strategies which include demo-
cratic involvement, developmental parenting, the induction of disequi-
librium and some values clarification techniques.
13
Summary
At this point the reader may be somewhat confused by the
variety of overlapping categories set forth by the authors in their
attempts to simplify matters 1 In an attempt to sum up I will simply
mention that initially Kohlberg divided moral education theory
according to whether it focused primarily on behavior
,
emotion or
moral .judgment . Later he and Mayer elaborated a more complex schema
but never fully relinquished this basic approach. Their cultural
transmission category resembles the earlier behavior category although
it is more elaborate. The same can be said for a comparison between
the emotion category and the later romantic position ; and obviously
between the moral .judgment category and the progressive or cognitive
developmental viewpoint . Stewart provides an even more elaborate
schema but moves in the same direction. His distinctions appear even
more carefully thought out and also provide some sense of the histori-
cal movement of moral education. His distinction between the tradi-
tional authoritarian and cultural relativistic approaches is useful
in that it demonstrates what they have in common, a belief in values
as objective things, as well as where they differ: (a) the former
absolutizes values, the latter sees them as relative to a given society;
and (b) the former leans more heavily toward behavioral techniques,
the
latter toward the psychoanalytic. Otherwise his absolute
relativisti c
approach appears virtually identical to Kohlberg and Mayer's
definition
of the romantic position and his organismic structural
developmental
approach closely resembles their progressive position.
Hoffman's division of the literature into "original
sin,
14
"innate purity" and "tabula rasa" positions is somewhat misleading if
his readers assume that these are systematic philosophic positions. He
seems, instead, to use these terms as a convenient way to organize the
extensive amount of research which he has reviewed.
Nevertheless each of his three positions gets at a part of the
truth about human nature and none should be ignored. As we shall see in
the following chapter, there is an anomic element in human nature,
resembling Hoffman's "original sin" category, that resists all efforts
to tame it. There is also an innately creative and spiritual element,
similar to his "innate purity," which tends to lift us up above our-
selves. The "blank slate" category seems most appropriately applied to
human cognitive and social functions which have little in the line of
instinct to guide them. It is only when one of these positions is
preferred to all the others that a sectarian narrow-mindedness begins
to intrude itself.
The virtue of the cognitive developmental position, which we
consider in some detail in the following chapter , is that it attempts
to synthesize the several positions outlined above which, at first
glance, seem to be irreconcilable. It values the influence of the
environment without falling prey to environmental determinism. It
appreciates the dynamic quality of the human mind without falling into
solipsism or opposing the goodness of the human spirit to the cor-
rupting influence of the environment. Less successfully, perhaps, it
attempts to integrate thought, feeling and action into unified schemata
or structures without relegating each to a separate compartment.
But even synthetic theories have their biases and cognitive
15
developmentalism is no exception. As we shall see, despite claims to
the contrary, it continues to focus rather narrowly on cognitive func-
tions of the person. Unconscious, affective, imaginative, intuitive,
spiritual faculties do not receive equal billing, except for the claim
that they too fit somehow into comprehensive mental structures.
Despite its obvious inadequacies, it remains, in my opinion
the single most provocative psychological moral theory to date. It
asserts that morality is a distinctively human enterprise of enormous
complexity which cannot be compared with functions of sub-human
species. It has attempted to integrate the cognitive, affective and
social aspects of human existence into a universal set of schemata
which remove from morality the passionate, sectarian overtones which
in recent times have caused the very expression "moral" to be associ-
ated with narrow-minded obscurantism. And finally it has provoked a
thoughtful reexamination of the moral education enterprise to encour-
age the teaching of morality itself in a more moral way. Hence it
merits more extended treatment which I undertake in the following
chapter
.
CHAPTER II
THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
1. Introduction . In this chapter I will review the work of
the two cognitive-developraentalists who have contributed most toward
evolving a coherent theory of moral development: Jean Piaget and
Lawrence Kohlberg. Since the moral development corpus of the former
consists of one book: The Moral Judgment of the Child originally
published in 1932 and since the latter has contributed a steady stream
of articles, several of almost book length, since his doctoral disser-
tation on moral development was accepted by the University of Chicago
in 1958, this chapter will be weighted toward Kohlberg 1 s work. The
reader should be aware, however, that behind Kohlberg stands Piaget on
whom he relies quite heavily particularly for a general theory of
cognitive development. Kohlberg' s own theory nevertheless is unique and
in many aspects he has gone far beyond his mentor as we shall see.
After looking at the work of both these men, I will cite some of
the confirmatory and contradictory findings of follow-up studies partic-
ularly of Kohlberg' s theory, offer my own critique, and suggest new
directions for future explorations particularly in the realm of affect
and action.
2. Piaget and Moral Development . Piaget investigated Swiss
children's moral thinking somewhat obliquely by determining their
atti-
tudes toward rules for a game of marbles. He found that, because
of
16
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cognitive limitations, young children (ages 3-8) seem to confuse phys-
ical laws with moral rules so that they believe that rules are fixed,
external things rather than derived from human intentions and values.
The cognitive limitations contributing to this confusion are ’'realism",
that is younger children's inability to distinguish subjective from
objective experiences (e.g., believing a dream has some external
reality) and cognitive ego-centrism
,
that is an inability to realize
that others perceive things from a different perspective than them-
selves. Moreover, according to Piaget, young children exhibit a
unilateral respect toward adults to whom they defer because they view
them as perfect and all-knowing. The combination of realism, egocen-
trism and unilateral respect induce young children to view rules as
sacred and unchangeable. Piaget terms this form of morality heterono-
mous. His subsequent investigations confirmed his initial impressions.
He interviewed a number of Swiss children of different ages up to early
teens by asking their reaction to a series of stories. For example:
who is more worthy of a reprimand , the boy who breaks one cup while
disobeying his mother by taking a cooky or the boy who breaks a whole
tray of cups he didn't see while coming through a door? He found that
younger children judged the wrong by the quantity of physical damage
done. They also displayed a belief in immanent justice , that is that
one could expect automatic retribution for misdeeds.
Older children, by contrast, appeared progressively less
bound
by realism, more able to see others’ perspectives and
were more trust-
ful of their own judgments in counterdistinction to completely
defer-
ring to their elders. They were also more inclined
to judge morality
18
by intention rather than by the physical consequences of an action end
belief in immanent justice practically vanished by age twelve. Piaget
attributed these changes l) to intellectual growth and 2) to experi-
ences of role-taking particularly among peers. The latter, he
believed, was the principal dynamic of moral growth. So long as adults
try to impose on children their own moral views they only reinforce the
unilateral respect and deference to superior power characteristic of
heteronomous morality. Indeed, Piaget is pessimistic about the role
parents play in moral development. "The 'average parent' is like an
unintelligent government, that is content to accumulate laws in spite
of the contradictions which this accumulation leads to." (Piaget, 1965,
p. 192). He believed that the more mature, autonomous stage of moral-
ity is achieved primarily through the interaction of children among
themselves from which mutual respect, solidarity and reciprocity char-
acteristic of autonomous morality evolve.
Unfortunately Piaget has not chosen to pursue his investiga-
tions into moral development begun almost 45 years ago. In an inter-
view several years ago he claimed to have "other pies in the oven."
(Hall, 1970). His "other pies" have been principally in the area of
cognitive development and a new discipline practically of his own
invention called genetic epistomology. He has remained a theoretician
principally concerned with investigating a question asked by philoso-
phers and psychologists: how do human beings know and structure the
world in which they live. Educators are well advised to heed the
words
of David Elkind (Piaget, 1968 , pp. xv-xvi) of one of his principal
English language interpreters:
19
Of particular note is the fact that Piaget nowhere points to
the practical implications of his work.... If one looks carefully
through Piaget's writings one seldom, if ever, finds an attempt
to deal with concrete problems of pedagogy or child rearing....
Some educators have engaged in certain teaching practices in the
name of Piaget. What should always be made clear in such cases
is that it is the educators interpretation of Piaget which is
being utilized and not Piaget's own ideas about educational
practice. If Piaget has such, he seldom voices them.
Despite Piaget's own lack of interest either in following up
%
his initial research into moral development or in making practical
pedogogical suggestions concerning it, many subsequent investigators
attempted to replicate his studies elsewhere to determine if, indeed,
older and younger children display two distinct forms of moral
thinking.
Hoffman, (1970) summarizes much of the research undertaken and
I will not repeat it here except to mention that the findings were
somewhat confusing. For example, regarding the decrease in belief in
immanent justice as children mature, studies by Jahoda, (1958) of West
African school children and Dennis, (1943) of Hopi children confirmed a
decrease in belief in immanent justice as Piaget's findings would
predict. On the other hand, Havighurst and Neugarten ,(1935) found a
greater belief in immanent justice among older children of six out of
ten native American tribes than among younger children of the same
tribes. In a more recent study not mentioned by Hoffman, Najarian-
Svajian, (1966) observed a similar phenomenon among Lebanese children
living in their native country among whom belief in immanent
justice
seemed to stabilize and not to diminish by age twelve.
Hoffman concludes that Piaget' s two-stage theory of
moral
development is not a universal, invariant, sequential
phenomenon as
20
cognitive developmentalists would assert. This conclusion, however,
is premature and arises from a failure to distinguish between structure
and content in stage theory. The confusion is understandable because
Piaget did not make the distinction in his work on moral thinking
(later in his work on cognitive development he elaborated the distinc-
tion quite clearly as we will see in a moment). Nor did Kohlberg
initially observe the distinction as precisely as he could have which
led to a subsequent revision of his own stage theory of moral develop-
ment. Before turning to Kohlberg himself, therefore, it might be help-
ful to explain how both Piaget and Kohlberg distinguish between struc-
ture and content in developmental stage theory.
Structure and Content in Stage Theory . The distinction grows
out of Piaget's later and more systematic study of cognitive processes.
For him a structure is "a systematic whole of self-regulating transfor-
mations" (Piaget, 1970 cited in Stewart, 1974> P» 215). It i s a system-
atic whole insofar as a set of laws apply impartially to 8n entire
system, for example to a set of whole numbers, or to the classification
of certain elements according to predetermined categories. It is self-
regulating because elements within the structure interact with each
other but remain within their own system. Thus adding or subtracting
whole numbers still leaves us with a whole number, (plus or minus)
not,
for example, with a fraction which would be outside the system.
A
structure transforms its elements. It is a dynamic process,
classify-
ing, re-arranging, adding, subtracting, reversing, etc.,
according to
its own self-consistent laws. Thus, for example, when
one grasps the
grammatical rules of language one can formulate original
sentences,
paragraphs, stories, etc., while remaining within the structure
established by grammar.
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Mutatis mutandis both Piaget and Kohlberg now claim that such
structures best explain the development of logical and moral thinking.
A series of structures of ever-increasing complexity and comprehen-
siveness called stages succeed each other in a universal, invariant
hierarchical sequence. Relying on Piaget, Kohlberg, (1969 ) explains
cognitive stages as transformations of earlier cognitive structures
as a person interacts with the social environment and the world.
Whatever data the person is presented with is assimilated within a
given stage structure. If the data are too diverse or complex a new,
more subtle and complex cognitive structure is required as an accommo-
dation of the thinking organism to this new reality. This new stage-
structure reorganizes and reintegrates the former, more primitive
structure into itself. Cognitive stages (both logical and moral) then
have the following general characteristics (Kohlberg,1969, pp. 348-349)
1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in
children’s modes of thinking or of solving the same problem
at different ages.
2. These different modes of thought form an invariant
sequence
,
order, or succession in individual development.
While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop
development, they do not change its sequence.
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought
forms a " structured whole ." A given stage-response on a task
does not just represent a specific response determined by
knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar
to it. Rather, it represents an underlying thought-
organization. . .which determines responses to tasks which are
not manifestly similar....
4. Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations . Stages
form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated
structures to fulfill a common function....
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Content then is the data or information presented for consider-
ation. The way the information is handled however, will depend on the
stage of development of the individual. A small child may group four
marbles and two rubber balls into a family where the marbles are the
"babies" and the rubber balls the "father and mother". An older child
may group them according to their material, function (used in different
games) size, etc. A still older person may hypothesize and attempt to
test out what they are made of, where they came from, what the experi-
menter wants to accomplish with them, etc., each according to his or
her stage of development.
To return to Hoffman's original objection to wit: Piaget's
moral stages are not true stages, i.e., they are not universal nor
sequential because the phenomenon of immanent justice increases with
age in some cultures instead of declining. Immanent justice is not a
structural characteristic. It is a belief, that is a content , arising
spontaneously among some young children because of cognitive limita-
tions and sometimes reinforced by more general cultural beliefs. The
limitations imposed by simpler cognitive structures should not be
confused with the beliefs to which they may partially give rise.
Secondly, according to Kohlberg, moral judgment is a sphere of
reasoning distinct from logical thinking. The latter is a necessary
but not sufficient cause of the former. Hence, even though one's
logical thought processes may mature, say, to Piaget's level of
formal
operations, that in itself does not guarantee the attainment
of a con-
comitant level of moral reasoning. It is therefore possible
that,
with cultural and religious reinforcement, belief in
immanent justice
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may persist into adulthood and co-exist along with sophisticated
logical thinking. This would be the result of more primitive moral
(and perhaps religious) cognitive structures which have not kept pace
with intellectual development. Indeed it is precisely my contention
in this dissertation (to which I will devote more attention later in
this chapter and in chapter three) that while moral and spiritual
development require a cognitive base, they also require specific
treatment and attention in their own right. Their evolution is by
no means an inevitable outgrowth of the development of logical tools
and skills.
An increase in belief in immanent justice with age, which
Hoffman considers so devastating to stage theory, because it seems
to reverse the purported sequence of development, is actually compat-
ible with sequential and irreversible structural development. The
immanent justice phenomenon is explainable as a logical consequence
of arrested moral-structural development combined with reinforcing
cultural influences. In Piagetian terms it could easily be the out-
come of a form of horizontal decalage or generalization as one
appropriates a stage more firmly and perhaps fixedly. However, to
ascertain this, an instrument which detects the structural outlines
underlying the content of the responses would have to be employed and
this was not done in the studies cited.
3 . Lawrence Kohl berg . Let us turn our attention
now to
Kohlberg. Unlike Piaget, practically all of his attention
has been
focused on moral development since he wrote his doctoral
dissertation
(Kohl berg, 1958). From his own research he concluded
that not all
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aspects of Piaget's theory can be supported cross culturally. Along
with an increase in belief in immanent justice in some cultures
already mentioned as contrary to the content aspect of Piaget's theory,
Kohl berg, (1968) cites evidence against Piaget's concept of unilateral
respect and the sacredness of moral rules for younger children. Among
American children, rigidity toward game rules declines between ages
five and twelve (as Piaget would predict) however, attitudes toward
moral rules tend to become more rigid and reverential during the same
period. Nor has evidence been found to support Piaget's contention
that peer group participation is a major factor facilitating develop-
ment. However, Kohlberg does cite evidence (Kohlberg, 1969) to support
the existence of three developmental characteristics of moral judgment
posited by Piaget in a variety of Western, Oriental and aboriginal
cultures: 1) Intentionality in .judgment . Young children in several
of these cultures judge an act as bad because of the physical conse-
quences (many cups broken accidentally) whereas older children con-
sider the intention to do harm (one cup broken deliberately) as making
an act bad. 2) Relativism in judgment . Young children view an act
as wholly right or wholly wrong. If there is a conflict of opinion,
the adult view holds. Older children are aware of a possible diversity
in views of right and wrong. 3) Independence of sanctions . Younger
children say an act is bad because it elicits punishment. Older
children say an act is bad because it harms other, violates a rule,
etc
Believing in the fundamental soundness of Piaget's approach
but
also wishing to account for some of its discrepancies, Kohlberg
set
forth his own stage theory of moral development in his
dissertation m
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1958, based on his interviews of 84 boys from ages 10-16. Approxi-
mately ten years later, data from follow-up research forced Kohlberg
to revise his stage theory rather substantially, though he maintained
his basic six stage outline. I will present the stages as he explained
prior to the revision and cite some of the confirmatory findings and
criticism of his theory and methodology. Then I will give some of the
reasons contributing to the revision. In separate sections I will
examine more closely a) how Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment relates
to emotional components of the personality and b) how it relates to
action.
A. Kohlberg's Original Stage Theory
Kohlberg's original stage theory posited three levels of moral
development, the preconventional, conventional and post conventional.
Each level was subdivided into two stages for a total of six stages.
Here is how he described the levels and stages as recently as 1970
(Kohlberg, 1970a)
:
Definition of Moral Stages
I PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level the child is responsive to cultural
rules
and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but
interprets
these labels in terms of either the physical or
the hedonistic
consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of
favours) or in terms of the physical power of those
who enun-
ciate the rules and labels. The level comprises
the following
two stages:
STAGE 1 Punishment and obedience orient
ation The physical
consequences of action determine its goodness
or badness
regardlessof the human meaning or value of these
consequences.
Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning
deference to power
arevalued in their own right, not in terms of
respect.for an
underlying moral order supported by punishment
and authority
(the latter being Stage 4).
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STAGE 2 Instrumental relativist orientation Right action
consists of that which instruraentally satisfies one's own
needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations
are viewed in terms similar to those of the market place.
Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and equal sharing are
present, but they are always interpreted in a physical
pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch ray
back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyality, gratitude,
or justice.
II CONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
obvious consequences. The attitude is one not only of
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but
of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining , supporting, and
justifying the order and of identifying with the persons
or group involved in it. This level comprises the following
two stages:
STAGE 3 Interpersonal concordance or "goodboy—nice girl
"
orientation Good behavior is that which pleases or helps
others and is approved by them. There is much conformity
to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural"
behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention:
"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One
earns approval by being "nice."
STAGE 4 The "law and order" orientation There is orien-
tation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance
of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing
one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining
the given social order for its own sake.
Ill POSTCONVENTIONAL , AUTONOMOUS OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral
values and principles which have validity and application
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding
these principles, and apart from the individual' s own
identification with these groups. This level again has two
stages:
STAGE 5 The social-contract legalistic orientation
generally
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be
defined
in terms of general individual rights, and
standards which
have been critically examined and agreed upon by
the whole
society. There is a clear awareness of the
relativism of
personal values and opinions and a corresponding
emphasis
upon procedural rules for reaching consensus.
Aside fro
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what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the
right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The
result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with
an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of
rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing
it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal
realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of
obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American
government and constitution.
STAGE 6 The universal ethical principle orientation Right is
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness,
universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract
and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they
are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At
heart, these are universal principles of .justice
,
of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights
,
and of respect for the
dignity of human beings as individual persons.
Kohlberg has followed the progress of approximately fifty of
the original group of male subjects whom he first contacted in 1958 up
to the present, reinterviewing them about every three years. It is
from this longitudinal study that he claims the strongest evidence that
his constructs are true developmental stages, that is that they are
universal, structural entities which manifest themselves in an invar-
iant sequence regardless of cultural influences (which may, however,
retard or even arrest development) , that each successive stage is a
structural whole, qualitatively different from its predecessors in its
way of solving moral issues and, finally, that each stage is a higher
or "better" (i.e., hierarchical) integration of moral reasoning than
its predecessors—in other words it builds on and integrates into
itself the structures found at lower stages but in a better differen-
tiated and more adequate and comprehensive way.
Kohlberg' s methods of attempting to prove his contention
combines both empirical (psychological) and logical (philosophic)
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arguments which are complex and difficult to follow. The reader is
referred to his 130 page article From Is To Ought: How to Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy and pet away with it in the study of Moral Develop-
ment (Kohlberg, 1971a) for a lengthy philosophic treatment and to the
equally long Stage and Sequence; The cognitive developmental approach
to socialization (Kohlberg ,1969) for a psychological approach.
His empirically based arguments for a stage theory of moral
development may be summarized this way.
a. Both cross sectional and longitudinal studies indicate
that older subjects show a greater use of higher stage thinking than
do younger subjects (Kohlberg, 1958 , 1969 , Turiel, 1969, Kuhn, 1976).
These stages do not necessarily prove that the subjects studied
progressed through the stages in an invariant sequence. Intervening
stages might have been skipped or passed through out of sequence. How-
ever, the findings do suggest a general progression in moral develop-
ment toward better differentiated and integrated ways of thinking.
b. These general age trends have been found in as many as
twelve different cultures (Kohlberg, 1969, Turiel, 1969, White, 1975)
ranging from the aboriginal Atayals of Taiwan, and village culture
on
the Yucatan peninsula in Mexico and Turkey to the urbanized
cultures
of the United States and Europe and include middle class,
ghetto,
delinquent and prison populations. These research findings
support
but of themselves do not prove the universality of
stages across
cultures.
c. Some longitudinal research gives stronger
support to the
invariant sequence of moral development. Kramer and
Kohlberg,
(
1969 )
29
reported on Kohlberg's original group of subjects a decade later and
found indications that their development throughout that period was
indeed according to the expected sequence with, however, a peculiar
"regression" back to Stage 2 apparently occurring for some at college
age. Later Kohlberg, (1973) presented evidence that what at first
appeared to be a regression was in fact an intermediate stage (4^)
which in all cases studied subsequently gave way to higher (Stage 5)
moral thinking.
d. Comprehension tests (Turiel, 1966, Rest, Turiel, Kohlberg,
1969, Turiel, 1969, Rest, 1971) indicate that subjects are unlikely to
skip stages because, while generally preferring statements reflecting
higher reasoning than their own when presented, they were unable to
comprehend or reproduce statements more than one stage above their
own. In addition most subjects understand but reject moral arguments
based on reasoning below their own stage. These two findings combined
suggest that the stages are truly hierarchical, that is higher stages
are successively more complex and adequate ways of dealing with moral
situations. Subjectively individuals perceive the inadequacy of
thinking below their own stage, appreciate and aspire to thinking one
stage above their own but are unable to grasp the complexity of
thinking representative of stages two or more above their own. Hence
they are unlikely either to regress to more elementary moral
thinking
or to skip a stage in development.
e . Intervention studies involving support of higher
stage
thinking and a "plus 1 match" (confronting a subject with another's
arguments one stage above his or her own) (Blatt and Kohl
berg, 1973 )
,
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or role-playing arguments from different stages (Turiel, 1966, 1969,)
also provide supportive evidence that, at least up to stage four,
upward movement is one stage at a time and permanent.
Kohlberg' s research findings have been criticized from several
angles. Indeed the research cited does not provide conclusive confir-
mation of his stage theory. Even James Rest, whose work with Turiel
and Kohlberg has already been cited, admits that "in most of these
studies one can find some flaw in design, or lack of controls or veri-
fication of assumptions’ 1 (Rest, 1974, p. 66). We now turn to some of
the criticisms leveled by others.
B. Critical Evaluations of Kohlberg’ s Moral Development Theory
Several critics (Hoffman, 1970, Kurtines and Greif, 1974,
Simpson, 1974) cite a study by Bandura and McDonald, (1963) as evidence
against Kohlberg’ s contention that stage development is irreversible.
Bandura and McDonald theorized that role modeling, especially by-
adults, combined with ’’the manipulation of response reinforcement
contingencies" can alter children's moral orientation in whatever
direction desired, forward or backward. They claimed that there was
a significant tendency among the children (ages 5-11) who judged
morality according to actors' intentions rather than the bare physical
consequences of their deeds to reverse their judgment when models
focused on the physical consequences. Other studies (Cowan, Langer,
Heavenreach, and Nathanson, 1969, Le Furgy and Wolshim,1969) found
similar results (the latter study used adolescent subjects). The
findings are not so clear-cut as they would initially
appear, however.
Bandura and McDonald used a Piagetian moral concept
(objective versus
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subjective responsibility) which does not necessarily distinguish
structure from content (see discussion above)
. More importantly they
do not distinguish between mimicking adult responses and genuine acqui-
sition and retention of a moral structural capacity. They provide no
evidence of any tendency among the subjects to generalize their regres-
sion from one attribute (intentionality) to others (e.g., preference
for expiatory punishment over restitution). In addition, Cowan et al.,
(1969) found evidence that downward learning was less stable over time
(two weeks) than upward learning especially when the subjects were
dealing with new as opposed to retest items (a refinement missing in
the Bandura and McDonald study) . This latter finding creates the
impression that the children were experiencing social pressure that
contradicted their inner experience, pressure against which even most
8dults are not immune as Asch, (1955) , Krech et al., (1962), Milgram,
(1963) and others have amply demonstrated. However, it does not prove
that their moral thinking had changed and the lack of perseverance in
the apparent regression beyond a few weeks suggests the children
tended to "rebound" to their original thinking once pressure was
removed
.
The most systematic criticism of Kohlberg’ s theory is that of
Kurtines and Greif, (1974) . The authors take a long hard look at
the
research adduced in support of Kohlberg and find many flaws. For
example, regarding the reliability of Kohlberg' s original
moral devel-
opment interview, they note that the only reliability
estimates
reported in any of the literature relate to interscorer
agreement.
There are no checks for internal consistency,
temporal stability or
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reports of using a standard error of measurement anywhere. In
addition, they echo a complaint of many others that no standard
scoring manual has been made available more than fifteen years after
the scale began to be used. All these factors make it difficult,
they claim, to replicate the research findings and cast doubt on the
value of the test.
Kurtines and Greif also challenge the validity of some of the
research findings. In this they are followed by Simpson, (1974)
.
Turiel* s, (1966) study comes under heaviest scrutiny because of its
ambiguous statistical results. Working with 44 junior high boys,
Turiel attempted to induce stage movement experimentally by exposing
individuals to arguments on both sides of an issue derived either
from one stage above, two stages above or one stage below the sub-
ject’s own. He predicted that the groups exposed to arguments one
stage above their own would shift more in that direction ( + l) than
the groups exposed to arguments one stage below their own (-1) or
two stages above (+2). The findings were just the opposite regarding
the - 1 and
-f 1 groups. The - 1 groups shifted slightly more in the
— 1 direction than did the + 1 groups in the -4 1 direction. However,
by comparing the f 1 groups with a control group which inexplicably
also shifted in the - 1 direction without any experimental intervention,
Turiel did find a result approaching statistical significance in the
direction of his initial hypothesis. Kurtines and Greif claim, how-
ever, that Turiel 1 s claim of a "borderline level of significance"
(t = 1.43, p< .10) is not acceptable by usual standards.
Moreover, no
principled subjects were involved in the study. (How could one present
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arguments one stage above Stage 6 or two stages above Stage 5?) Thus
one third of Kohlberg's schema is not confirmed (nor disconfirmed) by
the Turiel study. Thus far, Kurtines and Greif ' s comments seem well
taken. Other criticisms seem less incisive. Their comments on the
Rest, (1971) and Rest, Turiel and Kohl berg, (19^9) studies in comprehen-
sion and preference do not fault the design and concede that the sub-
jects tested (fifth, eighth and twelfth grade students) do indeed
generally comprehend and reject prepared statements below their own
stage of moral judgment, prefer and comprehend statements one stage
above, and prefer but do not comprehend statements more than one stage
above their own. However, Kurtines and Greif claim that the studies
"do not show that the normal course of development .. .follows the six
stages as defined by Kohlberg." It should be noted, however, that
Rest, (1971) does not offer his findings as proof of the natural
sequence of development but as a demonstration of the hierarchical
nature of the stages, that is that each succeeding stage is a more ade-
quate and comprehensive framework for making moral decisions. Admit-
tedly this conclusion is a derivative one based on the assumption that
one rejects thinking below one's own because of its perceived inade-
quacy, comprehends thinking one stage above because it is perceived to
be more adequate and aspires to but cannot adequately comprehend
still
higher stages because one cannot yet deal with their complexity.
Based
on the evidence and logic, however, this conclusion does not
appear
unwarranted. It remains for someone to suggest an alternative
that
better explains the data, something Kurtines and Greif do
not do.
Simpson, (1974) apparently following Kurtines and Greif,
alludes
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to an alternative explanation of the data in Hoffman, (1970) . A look
at the section she refers to, however, yields only the comment by
Hoffman that the Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg data may "merely indicate
a tendency to reject concepts at lower developmental levels which the
individual has already abandoned" (Hoffman, 1970 pp. 280). Taken as
is, this comment ignores the fact that the focus the Rest et al.,
study is not only on preference but on comprehension . The subjects
not only rejected arguments from stages below their own but were able
to supply reasons why they did and why they preferred higher stage
arguments. Moreover, Rest's 1971 study (which, of course Hoffman
writing in 1970 could not have known) indicates that subjects prefer
arguments above their own predominant stage. This coincides with
Hoffman's earlier contention that a "more critical test of Turiel'
s
formulation would require demonstrating that exposure to advanced
moral concepts makes the child prefer them to concepts at his own
present level" (Hoffman, 1970, p. 280). Rest demonstrates that this,
in fact, is the case.
Both the Kurtines and Greif and Simpson articles criticize
Kohlberg' s argument for the universality of the stages based
on cross
cultural data. Kurtines and Greif note that in Kohlberg' s, (1969)
report no mention is made of sample sizes, characteristics
of the sub-
jects, the range and standard deviations of scores, etc. Although
Turiel, (1969) does provide sample sizes and minimal
descriptions of
the cultures studied (excepting the Turkish village
which he himself
investigated'.) their point is well-taken. Kohlberg and
colleagues
have been lamentably slow in publishing studies
on which they base
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many of their conclusions. Simpson, (1974) simply asserts that the
study of only twelve different cultures is not enough to justify
Kohlberg's ’’sweeping assertion” that moral stages are universal phe-
nomena. Both she end Kurtines and Greif moke much of the fact that
none of the subjects in Turkey and Yucatan used predominantly princi-
pled thinking thus calling into question once again the universality
of the top third of the moral stages. Their contention that the
universality of the moral stages cannot be definitively proved by
cross-sectional, cross cultural studies appears valid up to a point.
Such studies may confirm the existence of a higher percentage of
higher stages among older subjects when compared with younger subjects
from the same culture, however, they do not prove that individuals
move sequentially from lower to higher without skipping stages or
regressing to lower ones. Only longitudinal studies can demonstrate
that with any certitude and in moral development the only long term
longitudinal study is Kohlberg's original group of American males.
However, a suasive (as opposed to a conclusive) argument can be made
that since similar (though not identical) age trends can be detected
in several societies and • that since in one of them (American) this age
trend can be accounted for most adequately by a stage theory of moral
development, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the same
dynamic is at work in the others, at least until evidence to the con-
trary is adduced. But the issue will not be resolved until cross
cultural longitudinal studies are undertaken.
Simpson's contention is that Kohlberg is culturally biased and
is attempting to impose Western philosophic conceptions or
morality on
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other cultures. She cites the lack of principled thinking in some of
the cultures studied not so much as evidence of lack of development in
these cultures as of Kohlberg's own preconceptions based on a few
Western philosophers. She suggests that Eastern and Western ethical
philosophers are fundamentally irreconcilable and that there is no
underlying structural unity. However, like so many others she appears
to confuse structure and content. Take for example, the following
quote (Simpson, 1974, p. 103):
Perhaps our scientific search should be less for eternal
verities and universal invariance than for alternate and
creative modes of coping with truly universal and eternal
problems of .justice and liberty, (emphasis mine).
Kohlberg contends that it is precisely justice that underlies
all morality as a universal form. It remains to be seen how Simpson
can speak of "truly universal and eternal problems of justice" without
betraying an underlying assumption that there are certain transcultural
norms governing the relationships of all peoples of whatever culture.
What standard does she use to speak of " truly universal problems of
justice?" Is she imposing a Western conception of truth on a worldwide
problem? Or, has* she attained enough distance from her own culture to
perceive rights and obligations which are owed and demanded of all
peoples? If the former is true she betrays her own cultural bias. If
the latter is true, it is difficult to see how her implicit viewpoint
differs from Kohlberg's explicit one which regards justice as a trans-
cultural principle.
It is not surprising that she does not perceive at least
the
potential similarity of Kohlberg's and her own view.
Her attempt to
describe Stage 6 morality is very misleading (Simpson, 1976,
p. 92):
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There is an inner natural lav containing a set of precepts
such as the value of human life which are valid for all
humanity and whose source is God or the nature of the
universe.
The emphasis on law (natural or otherwise) precepts and
authority are more characteristic of Stage 4 thinking than Stage 6.
More importantly the perspective implicit in this description is
static and self-enclosed. There is no awareness of the process
(first evidenced in Stage 5 thinking) whereby just relationships are
established. According to the perspective presented by Simpson, the
natural law or God ordains that human life is valuable and that humans
are bound to acknowledge the fact emanating from an authoritative
source. According to Kohlberg, Stage 6 persons’ thinking differs from
this perspective at least three ways: l) it acknowledges the value of
human life as intuitively apparent rather than appealing to an
extrinsic authority or law to validate its worth and 2) it recognizes
that morality involves a process of mediating this and other competing
values in a just or fair way, e.g., how does one preserve the value of
life and the value of truthfulness in a situation where telling the
truth might cost someone their life but where not telling the truth
might lead to a total break in communication and trust in a community?
3) To do this Stage 6 thinking assumes a perspective outside the
relationship of authority to subordinates and perceives how this and
other relationships within human society fulfill or contradict princi-
ples of justice.
Other more benign critics from within the cognitive develop-
mental fold, while basically affirming the value of Kohlberg'
s
research, hint that he may exhibit some unconscious biases.
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Rest, (1974, p. 69) mentions the strongly individualistic orientation
of Stage 6 as opposed to a more socially supportive orientation and
suggests that this may derive from Kohlberg' s non-academic experience.
Kohlberg began his own adult life involved in action in which
the central moral question was under what conditions it is
right to disobey recognized authorities and to commit illegal
acts. In his late teens at the end of World War II, Kohlberg
was involved in smuggling Jews into Palestine on a freighter
disguised as a banana boat. Unlike the Exodus movie and
Paul Newman, the boat was captured, and the whole crew,
including Kohlberg and the passengers spent some time in a
British concentration camp on Cypress. Here he says he had
some time to think about basic questions. In his formulation
of the higher stages of morality as well as in the set of
hypothetical moral dilemmas used in his research, the major
theme is how moral man can protect or promote human life and
dignity when lav/s or authority would compromise it .
(emphasis mine)
.
Haan, Stroud and Holstein, (1973) relying on their study of
counter culture people in San Francisco, see another possible bias.
Kohlberg commonly speaks of "hippie culture" as being almost proto-
typically Stage 3, i.e., based on an empathic interpersonal concord-
ance and support, much like an extended family, with little regard
for larger societal issues. The investigators offer an example of a
counter culture response to the Heinz dilemma (whether a man should
steal an expensive drug to save his wife's life) which may, at first
glance, appear to be Stage 3. Although the authors do not expressly
say so, in ray opinion the latter part of the response reveals a per-
spective on human relationships and society which is post conventional.
Replying to the question: is Heinz right or wrong in stealing the
drug, the respondent says: "He's neither right or wrong. It's not a
question of right or wrong. He felt like he was compelled. .. .If
his
background has led him to this action, then he should be true to
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himself. A companionate attitude is necessary to do the right.”
Up to this point, the reply seems to be Stage 3, that is moral
obligation derives from feelings for the person involved, although,
even here, there is some evidence of a perspective not ordinarily
available at Stage 3, an ability to philosophize, to generalize beyond
the specific situation. The concluding part of his answer, however,
demonstrates that the respondent has a higher perspective. "Companion-
ship comes before duty, that is companionship to everyone . . .his
feeling toward his wife shouldn’t have any bearing on the issue. He
should do it because of compassion for everyone ” (Haan et al., p. 611,
emphasis mine)
.
The respondent appears to understand the concept of duty
(typically Stage 4) and rejects it in favor of "companionship". He
defines companionship not in terms of a small coterie of like-minded
relations or friends (Stage 3) but sees it as a quality one should
exhibit toward everyone . He seems to be speaking of a universal affec-
tive dimension of morality which could correspond to Kohlberg’s more
cognitive conception of justice.
Haan et al., (p. 611) then offer the observation:
Since part of the fundamental developmental thrust of Kohlberg
1 s
conceptualization is toward greater abstraction, objectivity and
rationality, it is not surprising that the moral reasoning of
persons who explicitly reject these criteria for making moral
decisions would be designated as "immature" by the Kohlberg
system. More generally, the theory may appreciate moral devel-
opment within societies organized on rational-legal bases but
inadequately represent it when the fundamental organizational
principles are communal and are more immediately experienced
by the citizen.
Taken together, Rest’s and Haan et al.,’s observations
serve
as a caution that Kohlberg himself may not have been able
to
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distinguish clearly between structure and content in his own theory
and may have been deceived by some expression typical of one stage
of development so that he missed the underlying thought structure
which lent them a very different cast.
The criticisms discussed so far have concentrated for the
most part on the adequacy of Kohlberg's cognitive theory of moral
development. I have not reviewed either Kohlberg's opinion or the
critics responses to two other vitally important aspects of moral
development theory, 1) the relationship of moral thinking to moral
action and 2) the relationship of affective and motivational aspects
of personality to morality.
C. Moral Thinking and Moral Action
Philosophically Kohlberg considers himself something of a
Platonist regarding moral development (Kohl berg, 1970b) . He believes
that virtue is essentially one and is always the same ideal form,
justice. And he asserts that virtue is knowledge of the good. "He
who knows the good chooses the good" (Kohlberg,1970, p. 58). Psycho-
logically this second point is one of his most controversial con-
tentions. Psychoanalytic, behaviorist and learning theorists,
whatever their other differences, all assert that the influence
of
knowledge or reason on moral behavior is relatively minor when
compared with either social and environmental influences or
uncon-
scious motivations.
Nevertheless several studies have been undertaken by
Kohlberg
and others to support his contention that moral thinking
is the
single most important determinant of moral action.
Let us now review
several of these studies.
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1» Cheating and Moral Judgment
. Kohl berg frequently cites
the well-known Hartshorne and May studies, (1928-1930) as evidence
that what he calls "The bag of virtues" approach to morality is
empirically unverifiable. This approach is variously described as
training children, through reward, reinforcement, modeling, shaming,
love withdrawal, etc., to exhibit socially acceptable behavior.
Society or family determines what that behavior is to be and forms or
shapes the child’s behavior to conform to the pre-determined standards.
Naturally the elicited behavior varies from society to society. Each
society, or institution within a given society, has its own list or
"bag" of desired behaviors. One of the most commonly reinforced
"virtues" in a competitive society such as our own is behavioral
honesty i.e., not cheating or not cooperating with another in achieving
a common goal in a situation defined as individually competitive. The
Hartshorne and May studies revealed that there does not appear to be
two groups of people, cheaters and non cheaters, one of which can
generally be counted on not to cheat in most situations, and the other
which will probably cheat given the opportunity. Instead, behaviorally
speaking, cheating appears to be a random variable "distributed", as
Kohlberg says, "in a bell curve fashion around a level of moderate
cheating" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 227). If a person cheats in one situation
there is no way to predict from that fact whether or not he or
she
will cheat in another. Kohlberg asserts, however, that
one can predict
with some accuracy how someone will behave (given a knowledge
of the
situational variables) if one knows the level of moral
thinking. He
cites his own research (Kohlberg, 1958) and studies
by Krebs, (1967) and
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Schwartz, Feldman, Brown and Heingartner, (1969) to support his
contention. In his own (1958) work the product moment correlation
between maturity of moral judgment scores and teachers' ratings of the
subjects' conscience as evidenced in conformity to rules was .46.
Presumably one should conclude from that that the higher one's moral
maturity score, the less likely one is to cheat or violate other
socially defined norms. The Schwartz et al., study (cited by Kohlberg,
1971 as Brown, Feldman, Schwartz and Heingartner) divided 35 under-
graduates into two moral judgment levels using a short form of
Kohlberg* s moral judgment test as a discriminator. Subsequently they
administered a cheating test to them. Only one of the nine princi-
pled subjects cheated against about one half of the conventional
subjects. Krebs, (1967) in a study of 120 sixth grade children found
that 20% of principled subjects cheated versus 67% of those at lower
stages.
While suggestive, these studies are by no means conclusive.
Krebs' findings particularly are questionable. It seems hard to
believe that any sixth grade children have achieved a principled level
of morality. Nor does it even seem likely that 25% of Schwartz
et al.,'s undergraduate population scored at the principled
level.
One must bear in mind that all these studies were conducted
at a time
when Kohlberg had not adequately distinguished between
structure and
content (Kohlberg, 1973) . At best all one can claim for them
then, is
that they support a distinction between high and low
ends of the moral
development scale but offer no such predictive validity
for individual
levels, to say nothing of stages.
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2 * Delinquency and Moral Judgment
. Fodor, (1972) compared 40
delinquent and 40 non delinquent adolescent boys who were matched for
race, age and verbal intelligence on the Kohlberg scale of moral
development. He found that while both groups' modal score was Stage 3,
using a weighted score system that compares scores within a given
stage, the non delinquent boys scored significantly higher (p-<^ .001
two tailed test) than the delinquent boys. Ruma and Mosher (1967)
found that Stage 3 delinquent boys experienced more measurable guilt
than those with lower scores. These findings suggest that a certain
amount of internalization of guilt or self-criticism evolves at about
Stage 3 and that this may be related to one's conformity to societal
laws. This supports Kohlberg' s contention that the transition from
the pre-conventional to the conventional level is a critical one and
that those who do not make the transition remain relatively unsocial-
ized. However, more studies would have to be made to confirm this.
Kohlberg and staff have become involved in a prison experi-
ment with adults (partially reported in Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey,
1972) in which they analyzed the "moral atmosphere" of the prison,
that is on what level justice was administered on a day-to-day basis.
They found that the prison operated partly with Stage 4 fixed rule
standards and partly by Stage 2 manipulations of rules by the staff.
Inmates, however, perceived the administration of justice to be at
Stages 1 and 2. Those inmates who were capable of conventional
thinking when considering moral dilemmas set outside the prison,
reverted to pre-conventional thinking when asked what one should do in
analagous situation set within the prison.
44
These findings suggest that any attempts to raise the level
of moral judgment in the hope of reforming law violators will have
to contend with the human moral environment and specifically with the
way justice is administered on a concrete, day-to-day basis. Persons
who are deprived of their right to assume responsibility for their
own actions and to work them out in relation to others in a fairly
administered structure cannot be expected to progress very far
morally. If anything, however, it diminishes Kohlberg’s earlier
contention that the moral thinking of the individual is a prime deter-
minant of his or her behavior and reemphasizes the impact of environ-
ment on the level of moral development one achieves.
3 . Political Action and Moral Judgment . Ha an, Smith and
Block, ( 1968 ) conducted a study of political civil disobedience among
students at the University of California at Berkeley snd at
San Francisco State College. The Berkeley students were faced with
deciding whether or not to sit-in at the Administration Building in
the name of political freedom on campus. The researchers adminis-
tered Kohlberg’s moral judgment interview to 200 students. They found
that 75% of the men and 86% of the women who were rated Stage 6 were
arrested for taking part in the sit-in. Only about 10% of the
conventional (Stages 3 and 4) men and women chose to sit-in.
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Table : Arrested in the Free Speech Movement
Sit-in at Berkeley
Moral Stage 2 345 6_
Men % 60 18 6 41 75
N 10 22 50 27 8
Women % 33 9 12 57 86
N 3 32 41 14 7
In his own commentary on the Haan et al., study, Kohlberg
suggests that for the Stage 6 persons and the Stage 3 and 4 persons
the situation was morally clear-cut. The Stage 6 people believed
that their individual rights were being violated and therefore
protested. The Stage 3 and 4 people perceived the sit-in as a clear
violation of rules established by legitimate authority and as ’’good
citizens" would have no part of it. According to Haan et al., the
minority of conventional individuals who did in fact sit-in
asserted that "the University of California administrators had failed
in their role of authorities—as good authorities for Stage 3 and
as actual violators of proper legal understanding for Stage 4"
(Haan et al., 1968, p. 198).
Stage 5 subjects were almost evenly divided between sitting-
in and not sitting-in. Again, according to Kohlberg, their contrac-
tual orientation provided no clear-cut decision. Depending on how
they perceived the facts they could argue either that as students
they implicitly had agreed to abide by the school rules when they
were admitted to the university and were therefore contractually
the other hand, that the university hadbound to obey them or, on
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violated its end of the contract and hence all bets were off.
Most interestingly, almost as great a percentage of Stage 2
instrumental relativist men chose to sit-in as Stage 6 (60% versus
75%*) This confounding datum has been commented on by Kurtines and
Greif, (1974) as indicating that Kohlberg's stages are not good
discriminators of action. What good is a scale when people who score
near the bottom and at the top act morally the same way? Kohlberg's
reply (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 228) (though not, to my knowledge, made
directly to Kurtines and Greif) is that it is impossible to determine
the morality of an action simply by observing what someone does .
Edmund Wilson (and Thoreau) failed to pay income taxes as a
•matter of conscience' while millions of their fellow
citizens fail to do so for reasons of 'expedience'. The
behaviors are the same, and no psychologist can tell them
apart. There simply is no valid psychological definition
of moral behavior, in the sense that no observation and
categorization of behavior 'from outside', or ' behavioris-
tically'
,
can define its moral status in any psychologically
valid sense. .. .Before we can know anything about ... behavior
...we must first know what a man's moral judgments or
principles are.
On a much more sophisticated level, many psychologists appear
to make the same mistake as some of the children whom Piaget inter-
viewed. They believe morality is an external, "objective" fact.
But morality proceeds from the heart and the mind. Piaget's and
Kohlberg's contribution to psychology is that they have reestablished
the psychological validity of what otherwise were considered unempir-
ical epiphenomena; the inner workings of the human mind as human
beings grapple with their responsibility as a beings in the world.
To preserve a proper balance one can ignore neither the inner
processes
nor the actions emanating from them. While it is true that the
"road
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to hell is paved with good intentions” and that no amount of good will
or elegant thinking will make up for a Hamletesque failure to act, it
is equally true that unreflective action, even in apparent conformity
to an established moral code, can have equally hellish consequences as
recent adventures in unlimited warfare demonstrate all too well.
Kurtines and Greif insist on a theory that discriminates moral
from immoral behavior but no theory can separate moral behavior from
the inner thoughts, intentions and motivations which engender it, not
because of a deficiency in theory but because neither ’’moral" nor
’’immoral” has any meaning when these inner processes are ignored.
How then does one explain the odd fact that in the Free Speech
Movement Stage 6 ’’principled” thinkers found themselves allied with a
high percentage of Stage 2 "instrumental relativists”? Initially
Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) explained that a regression seemed
to occur among about 20% of the brighter college students in his
longitudinal study who, after exhibiting a mixture Stage 4 and Stage 5
thinking in late high school, in college reverted to a Stage 2 hedonis-
tic relativism "jazzed up with some philosophic and socio-political
jargon.” This seemed to be a temporary regression, similar to
Erikson' s "regression in service of the ego,” because later the same
individuals returned to Stage 4 and Stage 5 reasoning. It is quite
conceivable that students experiencing the disequilibrium of this
regression might in fact ally themselves with a presumably idealistic
movement while instrumentally serving their own needs. The outcome
would in fact be a rather embarrassing coalition of principled with
self-seeking protesters.
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However well this explains the Berkeley data, evidence of any
form of regression is troublesome to a theory which is based on an
invariant and Irreversible sequence. In fact it has led Kohl berg to
dramatically revise his theory and scoring system. He now asserts
(Kohlberg, 1973) that l) there was no structural regression and 2)
Stages 5 and 6 (principled thinking) are adult stages found no earlier
than age 23 in his longitudinal sample. The subjects who had appar-
ently retrogressed from a mixture of Stage 4 and 5 thought in fact
were at an intermediate or transitional stage between Stages 4 and 5
which Kohlberg calls 4^. These subjects define morality in Stage 4
terms only to reject it. They exhibit a form of "extreme ethical
relativism" i.e., asserting that the "morally right" is relative to a
person's needs or wishes snd has no other validity than that. There
is in their opinion no appeal to an objective standard beyond their
subjective needs or wishes. Correlatively they manifest an ethical
egoism or individualism by asserting that the actor's viewpoint is
the "natural" one, independent of and, by implication taking preced-
ence over society's.
The notions of ethical relativism and egoism held by Stage 4£
subjects are quite different from authentic Stage 2 thinking. First
4-J- thinking understands but rejects arguments based on Stage 4
thinking, while Stage 2 thinking does not. A Stage 2 person, for
example, cannot distinguish need or wish from duty. A Stage Uk
person has a concept of dutiful choice but denies its validity.
Moreover, at a person can deal with moral theory, that is,
he or
she can assume a viewpoint outside of a given society
to weigh the
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moral validity of laws and rules. As mentioned, a Stage 2 person
does not yet grasp the function of society beyond its being a mechan-
ism for the gratification of concrete individual appetites.
Now Kohlberg asserts that what was once scored as Stage 5
thinking was actually a sophisticated Stage 4 thinking now called
4B (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 31).
In summary, our longitudinal data now suggests that Stage 5
is a stage reached in adulthood, not in adolescence. With
regard to Stage 6, something similar is to be said. Thinking
we labeled Stage 6 in high school was mis-classified. No
longitudinal subject in high school had been predominantly
Stage 6, nor has any become predominantly Stage 6 by the
age of thirty, either. (Although we will not predict that
none will reach Stage 6.) Essentially, the material we
were scoring as Stage 6 was another form of sophisticated
Stage 4 thought, one which appealed to "conscience" and
"moral law" instead of "to the will of the majority" and
"the welfare of the greatest good."
As mentioned earlier this change in theory and scoring makes
it extremely difficult to evaluate research conducted using the old
methods. Were Hasn, Smith snd Block's student protesters really st
Stage 6 or were they sophisticated 4B's? And if so, how is their
thinking distinguished structurally from their non-protesting
brethren? Only a thorough re-analysis of the data will provide an
answer to these and many related questions. Kohlberg' s change of
theory and scoring has made necessary an entire new round of research
to back up his claim that moral judgment is the key to moral education
and moral action. Rest, (1974) has suggested that moral development
research has entered a third phase. The first phase was Piaget's
pioneering work published in 1932. The second phase was Kohlberg'
s
work commencing in 195^ and ending about 19&9. The third phase began
about 1970 with Kohlberg' s re-evaluation just reviewed. This third
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phase poses many questions and provides few answers. Rest proposes a
few of them:
What kind of variable is moral judgment? How can one put
much confidence in what people say when there often seems
to be such a discrepancy in what they do?
How is one stage "better" than another? By what criteria
are higher stages said to be more advanced than lower
stages?
How can one know whether stages of moral development even
exist? How useful is it to study moral judgment in terms
of stages?
Is morality really as cerebral and intellectual as the
cognitive developmental approach suggests? What is the
relation between moral cognitions and affect?
How is moral judgment related to actual, real life behavior?
Up to this point I have attempted to review the research
related to the last question. I will conclude this rather long
section with a look at the laboratory research of Stanley Milgram
on obedience which provides chilling evidence of the need for some-
thing better than conventional morality in our post conventional age.
In the final section of this chapter I will explore Rest's
penultimate question about cognition and affect in moral development.
Research in this area is sparse. My explorations will be more
suggestive and based on clinical data and intuition which I hope will
stimulate more systematic investigation.
4. Obedience and Moral Judgment . In addition to the
Haan
et al., study, Kohlberg frequently cites the Milgram
experiments as
confirmation of his hypothesis that moral judgment is prime determi-
nant of morel action. Initially reported on in 1963
(Milgram, 1963)
a fuller exposition of the experiment has more recently
been published
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(Milgram, 1974) . As it was initially set up and in its many subsequent
variations, the experiment was designed to see to what extent an
ordinary person would obey an apparently legitimate authority by
inflicting pain on an innocent victim. Specifically, subjects were
recruited from the general population of a small New England city to
take part in a "learning experiment" which apparently involved pairing
words from memory. One person (a confederate of the experimenter) was
designated as "learner" and the other (always a naive subject chosen
by a rigged drawing) as "teacher". Milgram, (1974) explains what
follows
:
The experimenter explains that the study is concerned with
the effects of punishment on learning. The learner is con-
ducted into a room, seated in a chair, his arms strapped to
prevent excessive movement, and an electrode attached to his
wrist. He is told that he is to learn a list of word pairs;
whenever he makes an error, he will receive shocks of
increasing intensity.
The real focus of the experiment is the teacher. After
watching the learner being strapped into place, he is taken
into the main experimental room and seated before an impres-
sive shock generator. Its main feature is a horizontal line
of thirty switches, ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts, in
15-volt increments. There are also verbal designations which
range from SLIGHT SHOCK to DANGER-SEVERE SHOCK. The teacher
is told that he is to administer the learning test to the man
in the other room. When the man responds correctly, the
teacher moves on to the next item; when the man gives an
incorrect answer, the teacher is to give him an electric shock.
He is to start at the lowest shock level (15 volts) and to
increase the level each time the man makes an error, going
through 30 volts, 45 volts, and so on.
In fact no shocks were administered except for a mild one given
to the "teacher" to convince him that the "shock generator" actually
worked. The experimental paraphernalia and the acting of the
confed-
erate was so realistic, however, that virtually no subject doubted
that he was in reality administering a series of increasingly
painful
shocks to a helpless "victim" strapped into a chair.
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Because the learning experiment is rigged from the start, the
learner makes "mistakes" in a predetermined pattern and apparently
receives increasingly more severe shocks. At 75 volts he grunts. At
120 volts he complains aloud; at 150 he demands to be released from
the experiment. From then on he shouts, pounds and complains about
a weak heart. At 285 volts he lets out an agonized scream and at 330
volts he is not heard from at all, neither do his answers appear in
the signal box.
Meanwhile the "teacher" (the actual subject of the experiment)
looks to the experimenter for guidance and is encouraged to continue.
The experimenter uses several verbal formulas in prearranged sequence,
the strongest being "You have no choice, you must go on" and "assures"
the teacher that "Although the shocks may be painful, there is no
permanent tissue damage."
Milgram found that under the conditions described 62.5$
(26 of 40) of the subjects continued with the experiment to the very
end, administering, they thought, shocks of up to 450 volts. None of
the subjects refused to participate in the experiment. Only six
subjects (12.5$) quit at the time the victim demanded to be released.
The results were so dismally astounding that Milgram tried
several variations including one during which, to administer the shock,
the subject was required physically to press the victim's arm onto
the shock plate from the 150 volt level on. In this "touch-proximity"
circumstance 42 . 5$ quit at the point where physical force was demanded
of them. Nevertheless, the majority continued with the victim
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protesting and screaming right beside them and 30% persisted to the
very end of the experiment.
Kohlberg,
(
1969 ) reports that he administered moral judgment
interviews to the participants in one of Milgram's pilot experiments
using 34 Yale undergraduates. He found that 75% (6 out of 8) of
subjects he scored at Stage 6 refused to complete the experiment
(though even they must have participated by giving shocks at lower
voltage levels since Milgram reports that no one ever refused to
participate in the experiment once it was explained). Only 13% of
those at lower stages (including Stage 5) quit. His finding is
suggestive but little more than that because the information he
provides is so scanty and, as we now know, he used his old scoring
system at that time (1963 ?) so that even his resistant Stage 6
subjects might now be classified as 4B. A re-analysis of and more
extensive publication of his data related to Milgram' s study would
be extremely helpful but, to my knowledge, has not been forthcoming.
Milgram himself, (1974, p. 205) reports some "weak" findings
in the following areas:
Republicans and Democrats were not significantly different
in obedience levels; Catholics were more obedient than Jews
or Protestants. The better educated were more defiant than
the less well educated. Those in the moral professions of
law, medicine and teaching showed greater defiance than those
in more technical professions such as engineering and physical
science. The longer one's military service, the more obedi-
ence—except that former officers were less obedient than
those who served as enlisted men, regardless of length of
service.
Nevertheless Milgram wonders "at how few correlates there were
of obedience and disobedience and how weakly they are related to
observed behavior" (p. 205).
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It seems premature, at any rate, to assert that the level of
moral judgment alone determines how one would act in a given situation.
Milgram alludes to other factors (several of which will shortly be
considered) which he hypothesizes exerted virtually irresistable
pressure on most individuals to violate their own sense of morality or
moral judgment. He concludes from the moderate to high level of
stress the majority of subjects experienced when administering the
shocks that by their own actions they were contradicting some inner
sense of right and wrong. The ensuing conflict appears to have been
"between the deeply ingrained disposition not to harm others and the
equally compelling tendency to obey others who are in authority"
(Milgram, 1974, p. 42-43).
However, it could be argued just as validly that it was not a
conflict between an inner moral code and external pressure that pro-
duced the stress so much as it was placing individuals in a situation
that was simply unresolvable from the level of moral judgment at which
they operated. "Not harming others" and "respecting and obeying
authority" are both conventional moral cliches—content-expressions
which suggest the existence of an underlying conventional moral struc-
ture. "Not harming others" would be more characteristic of a Stage 3
orientation (personal concordance) at which stage "niceness" and
"caring for others" is stressed; "respecting and obeying authority"
suggests a Stage 4 (authority maintaining set). If the majority of
persons participating in the Milgram experiments were at the
conven-
tional level (as seems likely since most Americans score
at that
level), they would very likely experience considerable
stress because
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they would be unable to resolve the competing claims of the two
injunctions. It also seems likely that, both because of their
cognitive confusion and stress and their conventional orientation,
they would obey an authority who seems to know what he is talking
about and calmly urges them to continue, as, in fact, was the case.
There are some other factors, however, which do not appear
to be purely structural but which nevertheless seemed pivotal in
this particular set of experiments. As described by Milgram, they
appear to have both psychological and social components. Among these
are:
1. Politeness - based on anticipating feeling awkward if one
were to withdraw from the experiment.
2. Narrowing of the cognitive field - individuals focused their
attention on the technical aspects of the task, e.g.,
articulating the word pairs precisely, pressing the switches
with great care, and apparently avoided concerning themselves
about the goals or morality of the experiment itself.
3. Seeing oneself as not responsible - persons saw themselves as
not morally accountable because they were agents of an
external authority.
4. Shift in moral sense - morality now is defined not as an
adherence to an internalized code or "principles" but as how
well one lives up to the expectations authority has of a
person.
5. Counteranthropomorphism - a tendency to ignore the human
beings in the experiment while believing that the experimental
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process has a validity of its own superior to the people who
conceived it or those who suffer from it. "The Experiment"
acquires an impersonal momentum of its own. "It's got to go
on. It's got to go on," one subject repeated without
apparently questioning why.
6. Post factum devaluation of the victim - frequently after
"shocking" the "learner" subjects would make such comments as
"he was stupid and stubborn and deserved to get shocked."
7. Intellectual resistance - some subjects were completely
convinced that they were acting immorally but consoled them-
selves that, at least within, they were "on the side of the
angels."
8. Fragmentation of the human action - in a variation of the
experiment the naive subject's responsibility was merely to
read off the word pairs while someone else administered the
"shocks." In this instance 37 of 40 adults (93%) continued
to the highest shock level on the generator while excusing
their behavior by saying the responsibility belonged to the
person who pulled the switch.
Some of these factors may be explained as defense mechanisms
of people who were acting in bad faith. For example, in order to
cooperate in the experiment one would have to suppress any fellow-
feeling for the victim and this could be accomplished by attending
to
the technical details, focusing on the experimenter's wishes,
feeling
helpless, etc. But this leaves unsolved the question why did
they
feel constrained to act in bad faith in the first place?
They were
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not physically forced nor were they threatened in any way. It appears
that authority, especially when represented in person, for the vast
majority of people has a remarkably compelling quality quite apart
from any possible sanctions. This seems particularly true in a compli-
cated social network such as our own which depends on the coordination
of a vast number of individual enterprises.
Kohlberg* s explanation that individuals do not resist a malev-
olent authority because they can not rationally justify a defiant
stance probably gets at some of the truth. The ability to think for
oneself is the quality of an autonomous person. But thinking and
acting in the face of social pressure to the contrary seems to
require self-reliance and courage possessed by few people. And these
are not purely rational factors but belong to the fuzzy domain of
the "affective" to which I now turn.
D. Moral Judgment and Moral Emotion
Both Piaget and Kohlberg have asserted that the cognitive
developmental approach by no means ignores the role played by emotion
or affect in human development. They view the development of the
affective life as structurally parallel to cognitive development.
Thus Piaget, (1968, p. 15) writes:
There is e constant parallel between the affective and intel-
lectual life throughout childhood and adolescence. This,
statement will seem surprising only if one attempts to dichot-
omize the life of the mind into emotions and thoughts .... In
reality, the element to which we most constantly turn in the
analysis of mental life is "behavior" itself ... .All behavior
presupposes instruments and a technique: movements and
intelligence. But all behavior also implies motives and
final values (goals): the sentiments. Thus affectivity
and intelligence are indissociable and constitute the
two
complementary aspects of all human behavior.
58
Kohlberg makes a similar assertion when he writes: "Both
Piaget' s and our position.
. .is not the position that cognition deter-
mines affect and behavior, but that the development of cognition and
the development of affect have a common structural base" (Kohlberg,
1969, p. 389). Elsewhere Kohlberg emphasizes the importance of the
way one perceives and responds to experience as the crucial factor
which unites our cognitive and affective dispositions. "Because of
its emphasis on ways of perceiving and responding to experience,
cognitive-developmental theory discards the traditional dichotomy of
social versus intellectual development. Rather, cognitive and
affective development are parallel aspects of the structural trans-
formation which takes place in development" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972,
p. 457).
One might conclude from quotes such as these that Kohlberg is
striving for an integrative theoretical approach which relates cog-
nition and affect in a mutually complementary way. Indeed, in his
Stage and Sequence article, (1969), he depicts schematically how the
moral emotion "guilt" undergoes successive differentiations through
the stages just as more cognitive elements, such as "orientation to
intentions and consequences" do. At the same time, however, he
reveals a bias in favor of the cognitive that appears, at least
partially, to contradict his efforts to achieve a balance between
cognition and affect. Thus he states that the cognitive-developmental
theory "emphasizes that the core of development is not the unfolding
of instincts, emotions, or sensorimotor patterns of thinking
but
instead is cognitive change in distinctively human, general
patterns
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of thinking about the self and the world. The child's relation to
his social environment is cognitive; it involves thought and symbolic
interaction" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p. 457). And again; "While
motives and affect are involved in moral development, the development
of these motives and affects is largely mediated by changes in thought
patterns" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 390). He leaves little doubt that for
him cognition is the primary determinant of moral development and he
seems to have abandoned his earlier attempts to work out the impli-
cations of a structurally integrated theory of cognition and affect.
In a sense one cannot blame him, for the word "affect" embraces an
immense and murky area of human experience which resist easy formula-
tions and appears virtually impervious to scientific analysis.
Kohlberg' s treatment of guilt, alluded to above, illustrates
some of the limitations of his approach. He considers guilt an
equivocal term which at one level could mean fear of punishment, at
another the experience of shame in the sight of others over a violated
norm, and still another a condemnatory self-judgment over the vio-
lation of a self-chosen, ethical principle. But again he displays
some ambivalence; for, while, on the one hand, he differentiates
the
experience of guilt according to one's level of moral
development, on
the other, he reduces the emotional experience,
bereft of its cog-
nitive determinants, to a common physiological
sensation. "In some
sense, the feeling in the pit of one's stomach
is the same whether it
is dread of external events or dread of one's
own self-judgment. The
difference between the two is that in one case
the bad feeling is
interpreted by the child as fear of external
sanctioning forces while
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in the other case, it is interpreted by the child as produced by the
self’s own moral judgments" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 392).
If anyone were to spend a few moments, not interpreting their
experience of reality but simply living it, they would quickly realize
that their experiences of fear, shame and self-condemnation are quite
different, even apart from the significance psychologists may ascribe
to these emotions. Even physiologically they are not reducible to a
"feeling in the pit of one’s stomach." Each is a remarkably subtle
and differentiated experience involving a whole complex of thoughts
and feelings. Shame, for example, may include that "feeling in the
pit of one’ s stomach" commonly associated with fear but it also
includes a red and burning face, the effect of embarrassment over being
discovered by another to be acting at variance with socially approved
norms. At a deeper level, it may also include a feeling of rage or
outrage that another (or part of oneself) is subjecting oneself to
judgment and humiliation. Recognition of one’s failure to live out a
self-chosen ethical principle may include fear and shame as described
above, and in addition it may include elements of anger at oneself for
failing to live out one's ideals and contrition or sadness over one's
failure. It could also include a re-affirmation of one's basic
sense
of goodness and of the ethical principle one espouses.
These are but a few, and by no means exhaustive,
possible
descriptions of the experiences summarized under the symbol
"guilt,"
and indicate that the investigation of "moral guilt"
has scarcely
begun.
The failure of the cognitive developmental
school to come up
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with a truly balanced theory integrating cognition and affect may be
traceable to fundamental epistemological oversight on the part of its
proponents. Kestenbaum, (1974) in an article entitled "On a certain
blindness in Jean Piaget" suggests that the great Swiss psychologist
does not pay enough attention to a phenomenological description of
human mental activity. Instead, asserts Kestenbaum, Piaget limits
himself to just one aspect of human consciousness namely the child’s
attempt to understand one or other aspect of its experience. The
child, however, experiences vastly more than what falls under the
focus of its immediate attention. Kestenbaum, (1974, p. 83) quotes
John Dewey in this regard:
The greater part of mind is only implicit in any con-
scious act or state; the field of mind—of operative
meanings—is enormously wider than that of consciousness.
Mind is contextual, persistent; consciousness is focal,
transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial,
a constant background and foreground; perceptive conscious-
ness is process, a series of here and nows.
In terms of Gestalt psychology, the phenomenological field of
consciousness consists of a small focus of attention surrounded by a
vast field of general awareness. Just as the eye focuses on one
point at a time but simultaneously embraces a broad perspective of
diffuse awareness, so human consciousness in general concentrates on
but one tiny aspect at a time out of a huge potential. Both eye and
mind range from one point to another so that the figure/ground rela-
tionship constantly shifts in a dynamic interchange; what is ground
at one moment becomes figure in the next only to recede into
ground
at a third. Out of the ground emerges percepts, feelings,
memories,
fantasies, thoughts, etc., and it is from these that we construct
the
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models of our world. In comparison to the phenomenological, lived
-
world, the models we construct to understand our world are derivative
and formal. They are simplified constructs which more or less accu-
rately summarize a complex array of experience. The constructs are
crucial to human knowledge but should not be confused with the infi-
nitely richer and more complex world from which they are derived.
Kestenbaum contends that Piaget does not always observe the distinction
between the child's relatively narrow, formal construction of reality
(a derivation from the lived-world) and its variegated experience of
the lived-world with all its affective overtones.
Kohlberg seems guilty of a similar error. The moral stages
which he has developed are constructs or models for understanding
reality. Designed as they are to express common patterns emerging
from human experience, they inevitably simplify that experience for
the sake of coherence. One makes a fundamental error if one confuses
the stage-models with the reality of experience itself. A person who
struggles with a real-life moral decision experiences much more phys-
ically, emotionally, and socially than can be expressed by
assigning
him or her a stage rating no matter how nuanced the thinking
that
went into the stage theory. For the stage theory to
continue to be
useful, researchers must continually return, not to
previous formu-
lations or theories, but to the moral experience
itself in all its
complexity. As long as Kohlberg continues to rely
only on a struc-
tured moral interview, the main purpose of which
is to detect under-
lying thought patterns, he will continue to
give undue weight to the
cognitive aspects of morality. In my opinion,
to offset that bias,
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a more phenomenological approach which in the beginning will be
content to describe on several levels (physical, intellectual,
emotional, etc.) and as exhaustively as possible the moral experience
itself without feeling constrained to fit it to a procrustean bed of
theory. Only after the experience has been thoroughly described
should the second step of looking for commonalities and patterns be
undertaken.
A comprehensive theory of moral development synthesizing
thinking, feeling and action has yet to emerge partially, I suspect,
because of the sectarianism of the various psychological approaches.
At this point I will attempt to compare the cognitive developmental
approach with a theory of moral development derived from the analyt-
ical psychology of C. G. Jung. Although at first glance the two
approaches seem and, in many respects, are vastly different, I
believe they are complementary approaches to the problem. Each has
the potential to compensate for the deficiencies of the other and,
taken together, to provide a better balance between cognition and
affect.
Erich Neumann, a follower of Jung, some years ago published
a book entitled Depth Psychology and the New Ethic , (Neumann, 1969)
which has been translated into English only relatively recently. In
the book Neumann persues a theme which is reminiscent of Kohl berg,
namely that a "collective", or in Kohlberg's terminology, a "conven-
tional" ethic based on adherence to a prescriptive code defining
one's duty in every situation is not only inadequate in today's
world but dangerous. No code-morality can hope to keep up
with the
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variety and complexity of moral decisions demanded of us today.
Neumann claims that among a few a "new ethic" is emerging which
seeks to integrate not only our ego consciousness (which includes
moral judgments) but our unconscious motivations as well. This new
ethic emphasizes individual responsibility, reminiscent of Kohlberg'
s
principled moral person who sometimes acts counter to group norms
and pressure, but orients to the good of society as a whole.
Although he has not worked out the implications for social justice in
anything like the detail Kohlberg has, Neumann obviously has the good
of society, or the "collective," in mind. The new ethic "does not
merely take into account the ethical situation of the individual, but
also considers the effect which the individual's attitude will have
on the collective" (Neumann, 1969, p. 92).
Neumann differs from Kohlberg in his analysis of how an
integrated ethical awareness develops. The main dynamic according to
Kohlberg is the progressive development of social role-taking ability.
The child, and eventually the adult, becomes increasingly sophisticated
in its ability to view a moral dilemma from the several viewpoints of
the individuals involved » The pre conventional viewpoint tends to be
egoistic and to see the other only in terms of his or her relationship
to the self. The self-gratifying role-taking perspective of a Stage 2
person is colloquially described by Kohlberg as "you scratch my back,
and I'll scratch yours." The conventional viewpoint orients to family
and social roles, Stage 3 focusing more on empathetic, felt relation-
ships of self and others and Stage 4 on a more unimpassioned social
perspective which views self and others in terms of their "position"
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in society. It is only at the principled level that people can gain
a perspective "outside" society and view not only the complex role
taking within a given society but how society itself functions on
behalf or contrary to the needs and purposes of the human persons
who constitute it. It is the "distance" provided by this perspec-
tive which, according to Kohlberg, enables individuals to challenge,
change and sometimes contravene societal rules and laws.
As we have seen, however, the perspective of principled
thinking alone does not seem to assure principled moral action.
Kohlberg himself seems to acknowledge that. In his longitudinal
study (Kohlberg, 1973) ,he found that the few adults who had thus
far demonstrated predominantly Stage 5 thinking had enjoyed not
only a "moratorium" in college to broaden their awareness of perspec-
tives different from their own but also had been faced with affec-
tively weighted social tasks which entailed making moral decisions
insoluble at the conventional level involving sustained responsi-
bility, especially for others. Milgram' s experiments and Lifton's,
(1973) investigation of Vietnam atrocities also lend weight to the
power of affect to influence action even in contradiction of moral
judgment.
Neumann, writing as he did more than a decade before
Kohlberg' s dissertation was completed, neither asserts nor denies
the efficacy of role-taking. He does, however, insist
that modern
ethical thought pays insufficient attention to the
influence of
unconscious motivational factors on moral action. Although
he
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comments mainly on the motivational or affective components of morality
his "Stages"^” of moral development roughly parallel Kohlberg' s and
complement the latter's more cognitive orientation. Neumann's first
"Stage" he calls the Stage of primal unity and roughly corresponds to
Kohlberg' s premoral and Stage 1 morality (Stages 0, 1.) At this
"Stage", "there is no individual or conscious ethical responsibility"
(Neumann, p. 60). Primitive urges and drives predominate as the ego
is barely differentiated from the unconscious. Group responsibility
is paramount. Any member of a family or tribe is considered respon-
sible for the misconduct of one individual. Ethical imperatives, such
as they are, derive from the Founding Individual vho received them as
some form of revelation and ere surrounded by religious taboo.
Moral-
ity is sanctioned by a superior power with supernatural overtones.
Neumann does not make the distinction Kohlberg does between
Stages 1 and 2 and in this his theory is somewhat
deficient.
Kohlberg' s Stage 2 sees the emergence into awareness
of the individ-
uals' power of self-gratification through
manipulation of the
environment and the needs of others in a primitive
exchange. For
Neumann the emergence of the conscious ego
occurs at a transitional
"Stage" he calls the "collective ethic"
which roughly corresponds to
Kohlberg' s conventional level (Stages 3 and 4) .
At this Stage
there is a conscious acceptance of Law
and individuals are personally
responsible to the Law or customs. What
concerns us here is not so
Vumann's "Stages" are not represented by
him in the
S&5S sequence^irreversible" etc.^bu^a^more descriptive and
anthropological; hence the quotation
marks.
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much Neumann's description of the stages, which lack the precision of
Kohlberg's, as his explanation of the dynamics at work which effect
the transition from a primitive to collective morality. As individ-
uals face the expectations which society has of them, in other words,
as they begin to assimilate conventional mores, they find that they
must conform to a set of rule expectations e.g., what "nice girls"
and "good boys," "good students," "good Americans" etc., do. Since
these role expectations never embrace all the conflicting impulses
and emotions they want to follow, these must somehow be "cubby-
holed." Intellectually, as Kohlberg says, a Stage 3 person may
reject as morally repugnant the self-serving motivations and reasons
of someone at Stage 2 and even provide convincing reasons for doing
so. This does not change the fact that the person at Stage 3 also
experiences similar impulses to be self-serving (as do persons at
all the higher stages). The difference is that the Stage 2 person
uncritically owns his or her self-serving impulses and experiences
no dissonance while persons at higher stages must either deny
the
impulses or admit they are somehow at war with their own moral
code.
Those who deny their impulses employ the classical
psychological
defenses of suppression or repression and attempt to push
their
impulses partially or totally out of awareness. In
effect they disown
a part of themselves and this part retreats into
the unconscious
where it continues to influence behavior . Those who
do not employ
these defenses utilize some form of asceticism
or training to control
their impulses. Psychologically they are healthier
because they do
not suppress but own that part of themselves
which they nevertheless
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vdew as unacceptable, unsocial or potentially evil. The price they
pay is conscious suffering over the perceived discrepancy between
how they want to be and how they ought to be.
Neumann is at pains to point out that, despite the price,
this step in the evolution of moral consciousness is a necessary
one for the human race as a whole; for without it the differentiation
of the ego from the unconscious would be incomplete. But for
individuals, especially those who totally repress their primitive
impulses, the price is high indeed. Huge amounts of psychic energy
are diverted from life tasks to sustain the effort at repression
with a consequent numbing and deadening of the self. Even more
important however, are the twofold dangers either that, too long
repressed, these forces will overtop the psychic defenses set against
them and eventuate in destructive behavior or the mechanism of pro-
jection will come into play and others will be accused and punished
(scapegoated) for the self's own banned impulses. War, violence,
suicide, alcoholism, bias and discrimination are all outcomes, the
price of which society is less and less able to afford to pay. In
fact, Neumann contends, our recent experiences of war, violence and
racial suppression make it imperative that a new level of moral con-
sciousness emerge, if the human race is to survive. This he calls
the "new ethic."
Neumann' s new ethic resembles Kohlberg' s principled morality
in that both presume a perspective "outside" society,
both are
concerned with the establishment of a just society and both appeal
to principle as the force that sanctions law and
morality. Moreover,
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they both believe that a moral person may and, in some instances,
must violate the accepted moral code in the name of something higher.
They differ as to what that "something higher" is. For
Kohlberg it is justice; for Neumann it is psychic wholeness. Perhaps
even more importantly they differ in regard to the dynamic which
facilitates the emergence of the "higher morality." I have already
mentioned that Kohlberg believes that the critical dynamic is con-
tinuing role-taking opportunities and especially exposure to differing
moral philosophies at college age which broaden one's role taking
perspective. Other important factors mentioned by him are sustained
responsibility in a decision-making role as an adult and involvement
in real-life moral crises which defy solution at a conventional level.
For Neumann the moral goal is psychic wholeness and the
critical dynamic by which this is achieved is by confronting one's
potential for evil. In Jungian terms this means encountering
all the
repressed and suppressed parts of one's personality subsumed
in one's
personal "shadow." I need to go back and re-encounter
those parts of
uryself which I felt I had to disown in order to be
considered "good"
in a conventional sense by others and myself.
Even assuming that I
exhibit principled moral thinking I cannot
exempt myself from the
task of confronting the shadow in myself.
According to a principled
morality with which I intellectually agree I
ought to treat everyone
with an equity based on the equal value of
persons. At the same time
I need to admit that within myself
there is a "character" who in a
sense, is set over against my ego and who
would exhibit blatant
favoritism to those who gratify me, destroy
those who oppose me and
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manipulate everyone to serve me. More frighteningly this character
demands a hearing and will not tolerate simply being pushed out of
the way. A trickster, he will subvert ray noblest aspirations and ell
the while point the finger of blame at those around me. The shadow
is a part of me and by a queer paradox, an internal justice demands
that he get an equal hearing.
I do not intend to go into the complexities of Jungian theory
regarding the shadow, for example, his conception of it as both
personal and archetypal, however, a distinctive difference between
Jung's and Kohlberg's thought is apparent: Kohlberg is striving for a
unified theory of moral development organized around the central con-
cept of justice. Neumann and Jung construct their theory of morality
around paradox. They assert that there are intellectually irreconcil-
able dichotomies in the human personality and consequently in morality
too. No matter how elegant and satisfying to the mind a unified
theory is it runs the danger of leaving out crucial, albeit messy,
elements of human experience. This experience is not unique to psy-
chology. As Jung himself says "By way of comparison, we might mention
the equally paradoxical corpuscular theory and wave theory of light,
although these do at least hold out the possibility of a mathematical
synthesis, which the psychological idea naturally lacks" (Jung, 1969,
p. 532).
The paradox which the "new ethic" seeks to embrace is between
the principle of justice and fairness toward all, reasonable, worked
out and implemented and the antinomian tendencies of the
shadow,
willful, arbitrary, selfish and destructive. To allow
the latter into
71
the light of day and to say "this is part of me, too," is frightening,
but to deny its existence is even more dangerous for then self-
deception, denial, projection and scapegoating run wild.
How each person reconciles the duality within remains for each
to decide. A genuinely autonomous morality means accepting the respon-
sibility for making one’s decisions and even accepting the possibility
of doing evil according to one's best light. This most emphatically
does not mean surrendering to destructive impulses. It does mean
admitting their existence within me and likewise admitting that my
most "moral" actions are tainted with an ambiguity which makes it
impossible to call them simply just. The danger of a Stage 6 morality
in practice if not in theory, is that those who have attained that
rarefied level of thinking will mistakenly believe that they have
transcended the human condition and its complex, often contradictory
emotions and desires.
To extend the paradox a bit further, it would appear that
despite what I have said thus far about the apparent irreconcilability
of the Jungian and Kohlbergian approaches to morality, they both do
orient toward justice. Kohlberg of course, does so explicitly. Jung
and Neumann do so through their concept of duty. Jung says: "The
ethical problems that cannot be solved in the light of collective
morality or the "old ethic" are conflicts of duty , otherwise they
would not be ethical" (in Neumann, 1969 , P* 14 , emphasis his).
The
duty or obligation by which I am bound refers to the mediating
of
competing claims within myself especially the claims of my
ego over
against my unconscious and its contents as well as the
claims of other
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persons. This concern for an "internal justice" is not unique to
Jungian psychology. While Jung speaks of complexes and archetypes,
Gestalt Therapy speaks of polarities such as "top dog" and "underdog",
and transactional analysis of "ego states". While differing as to
theory all assert that each element of the personality should receive
its proper due in relation to the others in a system analagous to a
parliamentary democracy.
The Jungian concern for justice extends further, however.
A person owes his or her own integration to self and to others in
justice, for the fate of society in fact depends on how well its
members relate to each other free of projection and biases, which makes
possible the social role taking so prized by Kohlberg. Psychic whole-
ness contributes to a just community. Indeed the just community will
not come into being without at least some of its members taking the
risk of looking at their own potential for both good and evil.
Conversely psychic wholeness cannot exist unless the individual is
willing to subject his or her life to rigorous moral scrutiny.
The implications of this approach for moral education are
immense. As I will consider in chapters four end five, it will not be
sufficient merely to teach people how to solve complicated moral
dilemmas like "brain teasers". Moral education must challenge individ-
uals to look into themselves and confront the light and the dark they
find there. It will hsve to teach them how to deal with the forces,
fears and fantasies that will inevitably arise. It may involve a long-
term commitment, analagous to a spiritual formation or internship.
It
will not be for the faint of heart. Techniques such as guided
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fantasies, role playing, dream analysis, and relaxation and meditation
techniques may be interspersed with more cognitive considerations of
moral psychological and social theory. All of which will have the
purpose of integrating the thoughts, feelings and actions of persons
into an integrated whole.
CHAPTER III
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND SPIRITUALITY
Introduction
. In Chapter two, I outlined Kohlberg' s theory
of moral development, reviewed some reactions to it, and offered a
critical evaluation. In the present chapter, I will use Kohlberg's
research into moral development as a jumping-off point to investigate
a related area which, if anything, is even murkier than morality,
that of spirituality.
There is a theoretical and a practical reason for doing so.
Theoretically, Kohlberg's research has led him to ask questions about
the moral enterprise that are more philosophical than psychological.
Convinced that morality of some sort is a universal human phenomenon,
he asks, is there any compelling reason why we should be moral? What
sense does committing oneself to the principle of justice make when
the world, both natural and human, is manifestly unjust? Empirical
research into the forms of morality which in fact exist does not
supply an answer to the question of the motivating force behind
morality. According to Kohlberg, an answer can be found only by
shifting to a different level of discourse namely by addressing
oneself to the religious question (Kohlberg, 1973).
The practical reason for considering spirituality in this
context is that spirituality is a vital concern for millions
of
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people, yet there exist few but the most subjective criteria to guide
anyone interested in exploring this realm and in evaluating the many
competing claims. There is a profusion of religious or quasi reli-
gious movements in the United States ranging from the conservative
evangelicals, charismatics and faith healers among the Christian
churches to devotees to Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism, and other estab-
lished religions from the East. In addition, there are those unique
hybrids which seem to grow so well in American soil such as, EST,
Arica, TM, Mind Control, Scientology, among legions of others, many
claiming to have a scientific basis but all, despite occasional dis-
claimers, assuming religious or spiritual overtones.
The somewhat weedy richness and more than occasional bizarre-
ness of American spirituality can cause considerable confusion in the
mind of the onlooker. The carnival atmosphere which frequently sur-
rounds some of the religious personality cults can easily distract the
serious student from the importance of the religious question itself
inclining one to dismiss the whole affair as hokum. That would be a
mistake. As I hope to illustrate in this chapter, whether asked by a
Harvard professor like Kohlberg or by a potential teenage convert to
Rev. Moon, the religious question continues to be one of the most
important concerns of humankind.
In this chapter I propose to explore the religious or spirit-
ual question as it is posed by the individual. Basically, I see this
as a question as a search for ultimate meaning and value in life.
Next, I will briefly treat a subjective "response" to the question to
which many people appeal, namely the mystical, or more broadly,
the
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peak experience. Finally, I will propose a schema borrowed from devel-
opmental psychology which will, I hope, (a) provide the means to fit
the so-called mystical experience into the broader category of spirit-
uality, and (b) fit spirituality itself into the still broader category
of personal development.
A Descriptive Definition of Spirituality . Before proceeding to
the substance of the chapter, a descriptive definition of spirituality
seems in order to avoid at least some of the confusion which inevitably
arises around the subject. I have preferred the word "spirituality" to
"religion" because the latter rather strongly suggests an organized
social body with its own set of beliefs, rules, and practices. What I
am more concerned with here is the individual's personal experience and
response to that experience. I am quite conscious, however, that these
occur in a social context and that both experience and the response to
and interpretation of that experience will be greatly influenced by
social religious factors. I am also aware that "spirituality" strongly
implies concern with a non-material reality or realm of Spirit or
spirits, liy concern in this chapter, however, is not with the existence
or non-existence of such a realm. In the present context spirituality
means, pertaining to the highest realm of human experience, under-
standing, and endeavor, that which is most human. In light of this,
I
offer the following definition of spirituality as: The domain
of ulti-
mate meaning and value which individual s experience and/or
define for
themselves and around ^hir.h they orient or attempt to
orient their lives
Three important elements in the definition are meaning,
value
end commitment. It is my contention, borrowing from
Frankl, (1963,
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1967), that meaning is crucial to psychological health. I suggest that
spirituality is precisely the realm of ultimate or superordinate mean-
ing. The spiritual question is, what does my life signify? What gives
it its overall organization and purpose? The answers are as various as
the persons asking the questions—the miser might derive meaning and
purpose from the pursuit of money, the monk, of enlightenment, but con-
sciously or not both are organizing their lives around a central
meaning or purpose, that is, creating a spirituality (I leave until
later in the chapter a consideration of the relative value of each)
.
Value is employed in the definition to indicate that the ulti-
mate meaning referred to is not meaning in an abstract sense but
involves some form of personal affirmation and involvement because of
its perceived worth. Meaning and valuing lead to commitment , an attempt
to live out meaning in action, not in a haphazard fashion but as the
pole-star which guides one's life. It might better be described as a
magnetic field that influences and orients everything within its bound-
aries.
The resemblances between this definition of spirituality and
morality—say Kohlberg's concept of justice—are apparent. Justice
might appear to lend meaning and orientation to one's moral actions at
least. However, justice must ultimately appeal to something else for
its validity as a goal in life and hence is not in the realm of ulti
-
mate meaning and value. Let us return for a moment to Kohlberg to
perceive this more clearly.
Posing the Religious Question . Kohlberg claims that a stage
six understanding of and commitment to justice marks the acme of moral
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development. More recently, however, in a more philosophic bent, he
has suggested (Kohlberg, 1973) that, in one sense, the achievement of
stage six creates more problems than it solves. The ideal of justice
remains just that, an ideal. The philosopher, however, who descends
from the ivory tower and attends to the world, perceives something
very different; neither humankind nor nature seem overly concerned with
being just. No system of merit or virtue can account for the via
y
nature dispenses its rewards and punishments. Some are born bright,
others imbeciles, some to good health, others to disease and an early
death, some to wealth, others to grinding poverty, some are wiped out in
earthquake, flood, or fire, others live out their days in tranquility.
Nor has humankind seemed overly committed to righting natural inequi-
ties. Rather, it has permitted snd encouraged the grossest social
injustices to burden even further those already deprived by nature.
Our philosopher may perhaps be unmoved even by these facts, but
when his or her own flesh is touched for example, by enduring injustice,
failure, illness, or the death of a loved one, then the cry against
injustice rises from the heart. Kohlberg contends that perhaps the
greatest cry is wrung from us when we perceive the inevitability of our
own death. Why be moral when we and all our endeavors end up in exactly
the same place as the person who cares not a whit about morality? Is
not striving for justice merely one more form of self-deception, the
acting out of an illusion that what we do in a meaningless universe
really matters? There is, Kohlberg asserts, no level of moral
reason-
ing, which can provide an answer to these kinds of questions. A
com-
raitment to justice is not self-validating and one must enter a different
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level of experience. Comparing his approach with Erikson's he states
it this way (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 53):
Erikson's ideal man has passed through his sixth stage of
genera tivity and becomes an ethical man, an ideal corresponding
to our Stage 6. There remains for Erikson's man a task which
is partly ethical, but more basically religious (in the
broadest sense of the word, "religious"), a task defining a
seventh stage whose outcomes are a sense of integrity versus
a sense of despair. The problem of integrity is not the
problem of moral integrity, but the problem of integration,
and integrity of meaning of the individual's life and its
negative side, despair, hovers around the awareness of death.
The problem is also psychological. The concept of the self's
integrity is psychological, but the concept of the integrity
of the meaning of the self's life is philosophical or religious.
As Kohlberg states the problem, it appears to be an issue that
arises rarely snd only among those who have attained a Stage six level
of morality (less than one percent of the population) . It would
scarcely account for the number and variety of spiritual "trips" in
this country. There are not too many people with either the leisure or
the inclination to view their own death in this light. Most are too
taken up with the practical concerns of living, or so it would seem.
If we, therefore, believe that a spirituality generally evolves from an
existential encounter with death, then we are accounting for only a
small percentage of the many spiritualities existing today.
There are, however, persuasive arguments to the contrary.
Ernest Becker in his Denial of Death (1975) asserts that, far from
being the concern of a few philosophers and/or neurotics, "the idea oi
death, the fear of it, haunts the human 8nimal like nothing else; it
is the mainspring of human activity—actively designed largely to
avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way
that
it is the final destiny of man" (Becker, 1975, P» ix )
•
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Becker was a cultural anthropologist but his writings span
several disciplines including history, psychology, and philosophy.
In The Denial of Death , first published in 1973, be reinterpreted the
psychoanalytic concept of psychosexual development in a broader, more
existential manner as stages in the universal, human attempt to find
meaning and value in the fact of death. Against the argument that
few people, much less children, are consciously preoccupied with death
he responds (Becker, 1975, p. 13):
If the child has no knowledge of an abstract idea like
absolute negation, he does have his own anxieties. He is
absolutely dependent on the mother, experiences loneliness
when she is absent, frustration when he is deprived of
gratification, irritation at hunger and discomfort, and so
on. If he were abandoned to himself, his world would drop
away, and his organism must sense this at some level; we
call this the anxiety of object loss. Isn't this anxiety,
then, a natural, organismic fear of annihilation?
It is Becker's contention, then, that this fear of annihilation,
this basic experience of creaturely dependence and insecurity, is with
us all the time albeit at an unconscious level even in our earliest
years and is merely the psychological recognition of the ontological
truth: we are in fact creatures whose existence is precarious and
limited. This reality is too stark for any of us to keep before us for
very long. It is too painful to bear snd it would likely paralyze us
if we thought about it much. Hence, to some extent, our attempts to
repress that dawning knowledge is a healthy step. According to Becker,
then, what the Freudians called "anality" is in fact a crisis in
meaning. We, who desire to occupy center stage in a world of human
meaning and purpose are forced to confront the fact that we occupy
but
a tiny corner of a universe vaster than any attempt to
imagine it.
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It is a universe which, if not random, eludes by far, our attempts to
determine its unifying meaning. This split between what we can grasp
and what we aspire to is symbolized by our bodies. We have heads that
look up to the heavens and anuses that tie us to the earth. We are
gods, but gods-who-shit, desiring immortality but subject to transient,
biological processes, decay and death. The so-called "anal" response
is an attempt to control our fate by an excessive concern for order,
structure, and cleanliness. If things get out of order, if we lose
control, then we risk being submerged in random disorder and death.
Similarly the "oedipal project" has much more than sexual over-
tones. We desire to be our own fathers, "causae suorum"
,
self caused
and therefore, immortal. We embark on life-long projects, raising
families, establishing businesses, and involving ourselves in causes,
all of which create in us a sense of meaning, purpose, and worth in the
face of death.
Transference too is reinterpreted by Becker as an unconscious
attempt to find meaning outside ourselves by identifying with someone
or a cause greater than ourselves. He sees this as a universal phenom-
enon not limited to the transaction between therapist and patient.
Certain people whom we encounter seem to possess a special mana or
charisma which captures us. Similar to the phenomenon of falling in
love, transference inspires us to a level of devotion and service that
is puzzling to observers. Becker interprets this as an inevitable
and
basically healthy projection in order to find meaning and value in our
lives. The suppressed fear of death, however, gives to
the devotee
the sense that everything is at stake in the relationship.
To lose
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the other person, to become disillusioned with the cause, to see the
project or business fail, brings the person, at least momentarily, up
against the repressed reality that "all this will pass"
,
that nothing
and no one endures. As Kohlberg's Stage 6 hero wonders about the
worth of the moral project, so Becker's existential seeker wonders
about the worth of any project in the face of death.
Becker, then adds some breadth to Kohlberg's tentative ventures
into the relationship between morality and spirituality. Although some
may balk at his reliance on such concepts as anality, oedipal stage,
and transference weighted as they are with Freudian connotations, he
convincingly develops his central thesis that one of the unifying con-
cepts behind human activity is to experience and express meaning and
value in an existence circumscribed by space and time. He lends cre-
dence, therefore, to our contention that spirituality—understood
according to the definition offered above as the domain of meaning and
value around which people orient their lives—is a central human
concern deserving of further systematic inquiry.
If the spiritual question appears to be a legitimate one
let
us now spend a few moments investigating, in the limited
space avail-
able in this chapter, the answers traditionally offered
to the ques-
tion. There are, of course, almost as many answers
as there are
people and a comprehensive review of them would
involve a survey of
all philosophic and religious thought. I will
limit myself here to
describing the outlines of that phenomenon commonly
called the "reli-
gious" or "mystic" experience found in virtually
all religions.
to the problem of meaning in the faceTraditionally the answer
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of evil and death has been some sort of transcendent experience giving
rise to the conviction that, despite suffering and death, everything
will be all right. This type of experience has been given many names,
a conversion experience, a mystical trance, enlightenment, satori and
more recently, with Maslov, a peak experience. Insofar as these
experiences speak to the problem outlined thusfar, they convey a
fundamental, intuitive sense that everything ultimately cooperates
for the good. This usually happens as the result of experiencing some
form of "cosmic consciousness" during which the person feels a sense
of oneness with and participation in the universe. For Kohlberg its
essential "is the sense of being a part of the whole of life and the
adaption of a cosmic, as opposed to a universal humanistic (Stage 6)
perspective" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 55) • This experience may or may not
include a belief in God (Ibid., p. 56):
Even most persons who are not "religious" temporarily
achieve this state of mind when on the mountain top or
before the ocean. At such a time, what is ordinarily
background becomes foreground, and the self is no longer
figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and
ourselves as part of that unity. This experience of unity,
often treated as a mere rush of mystic feeling, is also
associated with the structure of conviction.
William James in his The Varieties of Religious Experiences
(1902), still a standard text for students of religious phenomena,
cites many examples of experiences of this nature. One such example
concerns Richard Bucke, himself the author of a book on "cosmic con-
sciousness" at the turn of the century. He describes his own experi-
ence while riding home in a hansom from a pleasant evening with
friends (James, 1902 , pp. 380-381 ):
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My mind, deeply under the influence of the ideas, images,
and emotions, called up by the reading and talk, was calm
and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, almost passive
enjoyment, not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images,
and emotions flow of themselves, as it were, through my mind.
All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself
wrapped in a flame colored cloud. For an instant, I thought
of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that
great city; the next, I knew that the fire was within myself.
Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation
of immense joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by
an intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among
other things, I did not merely come to believe, but I saw
that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is on
the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in myself
of eternal life.... I saw that all men are immortal; that the
cosmic order is such that without any peradventure all things
work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation
principle of the world, of all worlds is what we call love,
and that the happiness of each and all is in the long run
absolutely certain. The vision lasted a few seconds and was
gone but the memory of it and the sense of the reality of what
it taught has remained during the quarter of a century which
has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed was
true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness,
has never, even during periods of the deepest depression, been
lost.
Not all mystical experiences are as powerful as this one but
from such experiences as these James deduced four common character-
istics (Ibid., p. 380-381):
1. Ineffability . It is an experience that is fundamentally
incommunicable to others. In this regard it is more like a
feeling than an intellectual state.
2. Noetic quality . The experience does, however, include an
"understanding", but it is an understanding which is intuitive
rather than discursive. In the experience itself, the meaning
of life, suffering and death appears clear. The
experience
contains or perhaps more accurately is the "answer" to the
absence of meaning. However, it seems impossible to
communi-
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cate this answer to others. James notes that because of
their incommunicable nature these experiences have no
authority to compel others outside the experience to accept
the "truth" contained within. The experiences do, however,
"break down the authority of the non-mystical or rational
consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses
alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness.
They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in
which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them,
we may freely continue to have faith" (James, 1902, p. 332).
3. Transiency . Mystical experiences seldom last more than a
half hour. However, from such experiences an underlying
development can take place based, as it were, on the insights
gained from these transient events.
4. Passivity . The experience seems to happen to people rather
than being initiated or generated frr them. Certain voluntary
preparatory events such as prayer, meditation etc., may or
may not precede it but the event itself appears to be of a
wholly different order. As James describes it, "the mystic
feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed some-
times as if he were grasped and held by a superior power"
(Ibid., p. 381).
The outcome of the mystical experience is a feeling
of assur-
ance, a state of virtually unshakeable certitude, that
even in the
face of death, life has meaning because the mystic
has experienced
The experience described,
that meaning in an almost sensuous way.
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then, is not a natural outgrowth and reorganization of a lower cogni-
tive or moral stage, a higher level of abstraction or of justice;
rather it appears to be radically discontinuous with what precedes it.
It pertains to a different way of knowing too little understood in the
western intellectual tradition. In a unique way, it appears to unite
the concrete and specific with the abstract and universal, intellect
and will with emotions and sensations to create an experience of
wholeness and oneness with Being.
More recently Maslow (1970) has ascribed similar attributes to
what he calls ’’peak experiences' 1 which he believes to be natural
expressions of human nature. In these experiences "the universe is
perceived as an integrated and unified whole..." a perception so
profound that "it can change the person's character and his Weltan-
schauung for ever after" (Ibid., p. 59) • The cognition of being
(B-cognition) is more detached from human concerns and instrumental-
ities so that the world is perceived as it is in itself (what Kohlberg
calls a "decentering of the ego"), rather than how it may be used.
The experience is self—validating, that is it needs to appeal to
nothing else to justify it and life itself. "Peak experiences can
make life worthwhile by their occasional occurance. They give
meaning to life itself" (Ibid., p. 62). The world is seen as good,
beautiful, worthwhile, etc. In the process evil is accepted and
integrated into the whole as are other dichotomies and polarities.
Like James, Maslow sees the peak experiences as passive, that
is as
happening to the person and rendering him or her more humble
and
parallel the experience of dying theready to listen. They can even
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"good death", that is they include an element of reconciliation and
acceptance of death. People simultaneously feel more like themselves,
active, capable, and responsible and more able to transcend themselves
to become, at least relatively, selfless and egoless.
From the description it would appear that mystical or peak
experiences would be extremely rare occurances. Maslow, at one time
divided his subjects into "peakers" and "non peakers"—those who had
and did not have peak experiences. Gradually, however, he became
convinced that some sort of peak experiences were available to virtu-
ally everyone and that those who did not report them were afraid of
them, suppressed them, and managed to "forget" them. He suggested
that for those with mechanistic or materialistic world views, peak
experiences had no place and were interpreted, when they did occur,
as threats to their sanity. His opinion, to my knowledge, was more
impressionistic than backed up by hard data.
More recently, Greely (1974) has attempted to determine how
frequently mystical or peak experiences do occur in the general
population. He conducted a national survey composed of 1467 subjects.
Among the questions he asked was: "With what frequency have you felt
as though you were very close to a powerful, spiritual force that
seemed to lift you out of yourself?" (Greely, 1974, p» 140). In a
preliminary analysis of the data he reports that thirty—five percent
of his subjects responded that this had occurred once or several times
in their experience. It would seem that this type of experience then,
is not at all rare. Greely, who describes himself as "a hard-nosed
rational empiricist skeptic" and "one of the least mystical persons
88
I know" (Ibid., p. 123), speculates that perhaps 50% of the American
population has some form of mystical or peak experience, some of which
may not fall under the type of question framed in his questionnaire.
Although investigations like Maslow's and Greely' s leave much
to be desired in terms of providing us with hard data, they do suggest
that there exists a wide-spread phenomenon of human experience which
by its own power and illumination conveys to those who undergo it the
concrete conviction and understanding that their lives have meaning
in the cosmic scheme of things. Because these experiences are sub-
jective and essentially incommunicable it would seen that, apart from
describing and cataloguing them, psychology would have little to say
about them. However, these experiences happen to human subjects who
are subject to the same developmental schemata as everyone else.
Mystics invariably interpret their experiences both to themselves and
other people. The quality of these interpretations depends on the
individuals cultural background, world-view, and level of development.
Moreover, it has happened more than once in human history that mystics
have spearheaded social revolution, frequently with disastrous conse-
quences. To note just one negative instance, Cohn (1970) describes
the depradations of one John Bockelson, known as John of Leyden,
a
sixteenth century anabaptist and apparently a genuine, though
unbal-
anced, mystic (Cohn cited in Greely, 1974, pp. 103-106).
The Anabaptist boasted of their innocence of
book-learaing
and declared that it was the unlearned who had
been chosen
by God to redeem the world. When they sacked
the cathedral
they took particular delight in defiling, tearing
up, and
burning the books and manuscripts of its old
library
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Bockelson 1 s first important act (as the new ruler of the
city of Munster) was—characteristically—at once a reli-
gious and a political one. Early in May he ran naked
through the town in a frenzy and then fell into a silent
ecstasy which lasted three days. When speech returned to
him, he called the population together and announced that
God had revealed to him that the constitution of the town,
being the work of men, must be replaced by a new one which
would be the work of God....
What followed was a new legal code encompassing a strange combination
of puritanical morality, socialism, and sexual license (for men only)
cruelly enforced.
Terror...was intensified during Bockelson 1 s reign. Within a
few days of his proclamation of the monarchy Dusentschur
(a Bockelson sympathizer) proclaimed that it had been revealed
to him that in the future all who persisted in sinning against
the recognized truth must be brought before the king and
sentenced to death. .. .Within a couple of days, executions
began. The first victims were women; one was beheaded for
denying her husband his marital rights, another for bigamy
—
for the practice was of course entirely a male prerogative
a third for insulting a preacher and mocking his doctrine.
Instances to the contrary, of course, can be cited of other
mystics who made monumental contributions to society as well. I note
this one example, in fact, representative of hundreds of others, to
emphasize that while mysticism is frequently a very private and sub-
jective experience, it can and sometimes does have potent social
consequences. It behooves us, therefore, not only to respect the
uniqueness of the mystical experience, but also to be concerned with
the overall intellectual, moral, and emotional development
of those
who have them. For it is on this development that will
depend how
mystics make sense of their experience and relate it to
their everyday
experience and life.
The fact that many spiritual movements with
mystic overtones
to want to remove themselves as far asin the United States today seem
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possible from social involvement, does not guarantee that this will
always be so. In fact, some, such as the Arica training, exist for
the express purpose of effecting a social change of consciousness.
However laudable the goal, mystical awareness is often combined with
social naivete and sometimes something worse. A friend of mine
recounts how during his advanced training as an Arican, many of his
co-trainees, (who would soon be training others), regularly stole
money and valuables from each other. Evidently, their level of social
consciousness had not yet matched the heights of their mystical
aspirations.
It seems therefore, that mysticism or, in secular terms, peak
experiences, do play an important role in assisting some people to
come to terms with the meaning of their lives. It is then an impor-
tant, and perhaps a necessary ingredient for those who seek a meaning
and value which reason alone cannot provide them with. However, as
must also be becoming apparent, mystical or peak experiences need to
be integrated into one's overall psychological and social make-up for
a genuine spirituality to come into being.
I will now, therefore, propose some tentative criteria which
should enable the investigator to determine how effectively a given
form of spirituality (with mystical overtones or not) contributes to
human development overall.
Developmental Criteria . As long as a mystical experience
remains personal and uncommunicated, and as long as it has no influ-
ence on how one orients and directs one's life, it does not
figure
as a part of a person's spirituality as I defined it
earlier. Once,
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however, it is recognized as a basis for meaning and purpose in life
and one begins to act in light of the significance and direction
provided by it, then a social dimension begins to manifest itself.
A private, subjective phenomenon, as it were, goes public. It is at
this level that it is capable of being studied and evaluated according
to developmental criteria. The experience itself may be ineffable and
essentially incommunicable, but this does not discourage people from
attempting to understand their experience, to fit it into schemata
derived from their everyday experience, and to communicate what
happened to others. This they can only do according to the level of
personal and social adjustment they have attained. Thus a John of
Leyden, a Francis of Assisi, a Don Juan Mateus, a Baba Ram Das, have
all probably had ineffable mystical experiences but each has received
it within the context of a unique personal and cultural history which
can be observed and to some extent, evaluated. It is at this level
that I believe some of the developmental insights of Piaget, Kohlberg
and Loevinger can be employed fruitfully. What I offer below is a
theoretical schema, based on no data, which attempts to adapt develop-
mental theory to types of spirituality. In this schema, I will attempt
to describe how individuals view the ultimate source of meaning
in
their lives and how they relate to that meaning. In addition,
I will
suggest what might be typical feeling responses at each stage.
Finally, I will attempt to express what kind of social
relationships
might derive from a given attitude. I do not offer these
descriptions
as stages in the strict cognitive developmental
sense outlined m
Chapter two, that is an invariant and successively
more adequate and
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Stage 1
iizpothetiee] Stages of Spiritual
- Source^Oeaning 8t stage 1 is M equivocal tan,
since meaning here tends to be identified with an
extrinsic and arbitrary power or exercise of power.
The universe is conceived of as operating by force
or sometimes conflicting forces of either a personal
or impersonal nature outside the individual. The
force on forces supply our basic physical needs
(sometimes) in an arbitrary way. As a result, life
is a hazardous enterprise and an important ingredient
for survival is unquestioning subordination to the
powers that be. Part of this subordination involves
the observance of taboos about certain places, objects,
and things. Violation of the taboos carries with it
an automatic reprisal and a cutting off from the
power source. This can only be undone by some form of
propitiation which has the effect of re-establishing
contact with the source.
Feeling Response is a feeling of fear and awe in the
sense described by Otto (1958) that is not simply fear
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of someone stronger but fear of something uncanny and
basically unfathomable.
Social Relationship
. This deference to a superior
spiritual power carries over into other relationships
—
especially those involving a spiritual fraternity or
association. Authority is exercised and deferred to
absolutely.
Stage 2 - Source of Meaning resides partly outside the individ-
ual and partly within. In both cases, it remains
somewhat arbitrary and fragmented depending as it does
on the fulfillment of various needs as they arise;
one cannot always know from moment to moment what needs
will be foreground. The extrinsic source can be a
supernatural power or the demands of society (conceived
concretely at this stage as this or that person "in
power” or simply another person. The individual
relates to any of these three as having sets of needs
similar to one 1 s own and is willing to "trade off" to
fulfill each other's needs conjointly (Kohlberg's
"you scratch my back; I'll scratch yours"). In a
formally religious context this involves the invocation
of magic, to give the "powers that be" what they need
while simultaneously compelling them to accede to the
individual's needs. Some forms of "chain-prayers ,
novenas, and even certain aspects of sacramental
prayers reflect this attitude of compelling compliance.
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Feeling Response is of self assertion and derives
from increased awareness and acknowledgement of
one's own needs as having a certain validity over
against the extrinsic demands of others. What is
still lacking, however, is sufficient ego strength
to pull together various competing needs within
oneself to organize and direct them towards self-
chosen goals. Fulfillment of the needs are the
goals and the highest meaning at this stage.
Social Relations exist only to facilitate the
gratification of individual needs. Relationships
are basically opportunistic and manipulative and
may involve a trading in spiritual goals. For
example, one may desire a spiritual "high" (a kind
of spiritual hedonism) because the "high" makes one
feel good and affiliate with an organization
(usually at some cost) to obtain it. There is no
common goal or commitment involved} only individuals
seeking to gratify their own needs (Something like
this may have been in effect among the Aricans who
saw no conflict in their spiritual quest and
stealing from each other).
Stage 3 - Source of Meaning derives from intro
jected values
of one's family, and immediate social and
religious
milieux. At this stage, one is concerned for
the
first time with a sense of self-worth which,
at this
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point, comes from the approval of others. The
tension between self and other is adjusted to by-
internalizing the demands of others in the form
of a "conscience" (the Freudian Superego, the
T. A. Parent, the Gestalt "Top dog") while pre-
serving one’s own resistance (the Id, or Child,
or "Underdog"). The former, however, tends to pre-
dominate, if socialization proceeds apace, because
self-worth is more or less confused with survival.
If one is not approved of, one will be excluded
from the family or group making survival impossible
(not always a mere fantasyl). Therefore, individ-
uals derive the greatest meaning they are capable
of at this stage from the family, social, or
religious symbols of their immediate environment.
Feeling Response is a need for approval and a desire
to please. This is combined with an increased
ability to appreciate the feeling states of others
(empathy). -There is also a tendency to disown
socially unacceptable feelings and either to repress
and/or to project them onto others.
Social Relationships . Belonging to likeminded groups
becomes important here. In a religious context, the
small religious group or church predominates.
"Fellowship" is emphasized but is sometimes in stark
contrast to the reaction toward outsiders or non-
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believers which is often intolerant and hostile.
A slightly less hostile response is the fervid
"evangelization" of non-believers to rescue them
from their own ignorance snd, incidentally, to
reassure the believers that their own way is the
truth.
Stage 4 - Source of Meaning . Systematized creeds, normative
writings, and traditions derived from one's cultural
milieu became paramount definers of meaning for
the individual. One's sense of identity and self-
worth shifts from parental approval to a sense of
belonging to a larger social body. Personal
meaning is mediated through society, religious,
and/or secular. Institutions take on a hallowed
quality and are seen as sources of absolute value
e.g., the Constitution, the Apostles' Creed, the
Papacy etc. Society, its institutions and tradi-
tions, is seen as a bulwark against social chaos
and personal loss of identity. From one's perspec-
tive within a given social meaning system other
systems are acknowledged but only as inferior
approximations or opponents of one's own. The world
is divided between Capitalism and Communism, the
true believer and the infidel. The individual
emphasizes and tends to identify with the observance
of forms, roles and conventions.
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Feeling Response is a strong sense of loyalty to
Church, Country, Party, combined with intolerance
of the opposition. Unacceptable feelings and
impulses are projected onto other groups.
Social Relationships include reverence toward
superiors (what the Romans called the social virtue
of "pietas" ), and a strict adherence to and
administration of socially defined responsibilities.
One tends to relate to roles, not people. The
value of the person increases or decreases according
to the position occupied by him or her in the social
structure. "Heretics'* or "Communists" are outside
the pale and therefore, not entitled to the same
respect as those within.
Stage 5 - Source of Meaning . At this stage a crisis of
meaning develops as individuals encounter meaning
systems which possess a validity apparently equal
to their own. They become aware, because of an
increased time perspective and sense of history,
of the cultural conditioning and somewhat adventi-
tious nature of their own construction of meaning.
As in the moral realm, this sometimes leads to a
period of anomie so in the spiritual realm it can
result in a kind of existential despair. All
meaning and purpose is called into question. One
is freed from one's social role and institutional
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•'faith" only to lose one's sense of direction
altogether. For others, perhaps more optimistic,
the search begins for a unifying principle or
principles within oneself and among the multi-
plicity of creeds and dogmas, for both a cognitive
and an existential-experiential ground of meaning.
These people tend to seek a more personal and
immediate means of relating to this ground of
meaning rather than being content, as were those at
Stage 4, to have that meaning mediated to them
through institutions and social structures.
Historically, in the West, Martin Luther embodied
this attempt. Institutionally, however, his attempt
failed for the most part, because his followers,
probably not at his level of development, merely
substituted one institution, the bible as inter-
preted by the various Protestant "divines" for
another, Roman Catholic tradition as interpreted by
the pope. Today similar incidents occur as many
young people reject traditional western meaning
systems, both secular and religious in favor of
eastern models. The context of belief changes but
in many instances the transition is merely from
reliance on a western tradition as interpreted by
one's local pastor to reliance on an eastern tra-
dition as interpreted by a guru. Meaning and
value
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remain extrinsic to their own experience.
Feeling Response
. Characteristic of this stage is
a growing sense of identity as a person distinct
from one's role within society. This seems to be
a uniquely western phenomenon. While reorganizing
and actively encouraging and reforming human insti-
tutions, people at this stage predicate the value
of institutions on how well they contribute to the
expansion and growth of persons rather than predi-
cating the value of persons on how much they
contribute to the institution or the collective.
Social Relationships tend to be ecumenical and
inclusive rather than sectarian and exclusive. The
principle of tolerance is willingly affirmed.
Stage 6 - Source of Meaning subjectively depends on the individ-
uals own experience and understanding of his or her
self. Included in this is (a) a level of self-
knowledge that includes an awareness and assessment
of one's defenses and projections; (b) being in touch
with that larger and more comprehensive self that
underlies but embraces our social selves (Jung's
persona) and our ego personalities. Various systems
give this larger whole different names. Jung calls
it the self, Assagioli the superconscious etc.
Essentially one perceives that one's own being is
or can be a self-validating source of meaning and
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value. Concomitantly one perceives the underlying
unity joining self and the world. The duality of
self and other, self and the world is overcome so
that meaning is not an arbitrary self-ish choice
but understood to be synchronous with the objective
order of things. This appears to be one of the
more important insights intuitively grasped in
mystical or peak experiences. The experiences,
however, are not always integrated well enough to
be expressed cognitively or socially perhaps because
the individual has not developed far enough.
Feeling Response . One's sense of identity compre-
hends the whole self rather than the ego and con-
comitantly one experiences a sense of oneness with
the cosmos sometimes described as "oceanic feelings".
This may be combined with the resolution to dedicate
oneself to the goals toward which everything is
moving
.
Social Relationship . One recognizes the essential
oneness of all creation and relates to all people
as brothers and sister. This carries over to one's
relationship with other life-forms and even inanimate
matter. Examples of this may be found in the writings
of Francis of Assisi—see his Canticle to the Sun
and Teilhard de Chardin.
This sixth stage, is of course, the most
hypothetical of all and well beyond my own
experience. Hence, I can only describe it
"from below" as I imagine it might be.
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Mysticism and Development
With the exception of the sixth stage, none of the stages
described above assumes the necessity of mystical experiences. It
seems quite possible that one could develop a spirituality, that is
a meaning system around which one would attempt to organize one’s
life, without a mystical transport. As mentioned previously, the
miser has organized such a meaning system around money, no matter how
impoverished that system might be. (At best, such a person would
probably be at Stage 2 ) . On the other hand, neither should we exclude
mystical experiences from the lower stages as Kohlberg by implication
appears to do. But according to the venerable saying of the Medieval
schoolmen "Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur", which
in modern paraphrase may be translated: "Who you are will determine
how you process what you take in." The signal being sent may be
stereophonic but a crystal set will reduce it to its own capacity to
receive. Thus a John of Leyden translated his "vision" into a reign
of terror, probably because of a Stage 1 orientation. A
pentecostal
fundamentalist may translate a similar experience into a Stage 3
relationship with a very personal Saviour with strong,
emotional
overtones and found a community of the "saved" who are
very loving
toward each other, but exclude those who have not
yet "seen the light"
etc. It is only to achieve a Stage 6 orientation
that I would posit
the necessity of some form of intuitive,
visionary experience,
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combined, of course, with the developmental maturity to assimilate and
to express it creatively. As Kohlberg accurately notes, there is no
rational, logical resolution of the problem of evil and death which
ultimately must be integrated into a comprehensive meaning system.
Voltaire long ago skewered with his mordant wit those who made fatuous
attempts to argue from reason that this was the best of all possible
worlds. The oneness, meaningfulness, and ultimate goodness of all
that is must be experienced not argued. And to do so, discursive
reason must, temporarily at least, step aside. Thus eastern systems
such as zen literally dumbfound the mind with insoluble koans to
distract it, thereby allowing for the breakthrough of a deeper,
intuitive reality and western systems speak of the "via negativa" and
the "dark night of the soul" in which reason shuts down before a
reality which it can only apprehend as darkness. At our present level
of understanding, however, psychological and/or spiritual techniques
can only prepare the way for that most mysterious of all human
phenomena
.
Whoever, therefore, are concerned with orienting their lives
around a central meaning and value system would do well in their
education to pay attention to their overall personal and moral devel-
opment. In addition, in their investigation of various psychological
or religious systems which promise enlightment, it would be important
to examine with a critical eye how well each system contributes to
the increased integration and development of the individual both
personally and socially. If one’s viewpoint is holistic, then
one's
spirituality, too, will contribute to the overall growth of
the
individual and humankind
CHAPTER IV
MORAL EDUCATION
Having examined some of the theoretical implications of both
moral and spiritual development, let us now examine some attempts to
apply developmental insights to education. In the present chapter
I will focus on a cross-section of educational approaches to moral
development leaving to Chapter five a proposal for a spiritual
education curriculum.
Only those educational approaches that have a developmental
orientation will be considered here. These may be divided into two
categories: l) those which are a direct outgrowth of and somewhat
limited to Kohlberg' s cognitive developmental research and, 2) those
which accept Kohlberg* s cognitive-developmental orientation but have
also drawn on other psychological (mainly humanistic) orientations
to enrich their curricula. The former group of curriculum designers
represents a somewhat ''purist" approach to cognitive developmental
education apparently shared by Kohlberg himself who seems uncomfort-
able with attempts to wed cognitive-developmental and humanistic-
existential orientations in a single curriculum. His discomfort
derives from a suspicion on his part that humanistic education
"some
times assumes not only that emotional aspects of education
are
important aspects of the educational process, but that
spontaneou s
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emotional experience and expression are educational goods or aims in
themselves” (emphasis his)
. He contrasts this with the cognitive
developmental approach which "stresses that the cognitive reorganiza-
tion of experience through successively higher levels (including
emotional experience) is the basic aim of education" (Kohlberg, 1971,
p. 74). Other differences in approach which Kohlberg sees are an
emphasis on the here and now and the uniquely individual by the
humanists as opposed to the cognitive-developmentalists' concern for
long term and universal progressions; the humanistic emphasis on spon-
taneity, creativity, openness to experience and trust, he considers
just another "bag of virtues" developmentally no different than the
"Boy Scout bag" of honesty, responsibility, loyalty, self-control, etc.
Kohlberg, and presumably the developers of purely cognitive
developmental curricula, consider that the two approaches, if not
contradictory, are at least confusing when melded into a single
curriculum. In contrast, some educators, whom, for want of a better
word, I will call developmental-humanistic, believe that the two
approaches are, or can be, complementary. Although intrigued by
Kohlberg’ s impressive theoretical structure, they consider the educa-
tional applications attempted by most cognitive-developmentalists to
be univocal, unimaginative and, for the most part, simply dull. They
persist in the belief that any number of humanistic approaches to
education will not only foster the humanistic "bag of virtues" but
simultaneously will foster development in the strictest sense of the
word. This is an orientation that I share as will become
obvious as
this chapter develops.
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A. Cognitive Developmental Approaches to Education
1. The Plus One Match . When Kohlberg first performed his
research in moral development at the University of Chicago in the
middle nineteen fifties, he gave no thought to its educational appli-
cations. Indeed, he doubted that his research could be applied
directly in the classroom. However, additional experimentation by
Turiel (1965) and by Blatt (Blatt, M. , and Kohlberg, L., 1973)
indicated that educational interventions to raise the level of moral
judgment were possible. It was Blatt who tested this hypothesis in
an actual classroom setting.
His first attempt was in a Jewish Sunday School near Boston
with a small class of a dozen eleven and twelve year olds. He hypoth-
esized that by encouraging group discussions of moral dilemmas drawn
from the book of Genesis and of some modem dilemmas as well he could
significantly raise the classes' mean moral judgment score. As
teacher, he was active in the discussion himself by supporting chil-
dren's arguments which seemed developmentally higher than their class-
mates' . In addition, when the class appeared to have reached a
consensus relying on arguments from, say, Stage 3, Blatt would intro-
duce a contradictory argument using Stage 4 reasoning. He was
relying on Turiel' s (1965) findings which indicated that
people can
understand reasoning one stage above their own level of
moral thinking
(hence the expression "plus one"). He hoped, by so doing,
that the
class would move gradually toward the acquisition
of Stage 4 reasoning.
Kohlberg' s moral judgment test was administered to the partic-
hour twelve-week course, as well as aipants before and after the one
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year later. Blatt found that the mean increase of his class from pre-
test to post-test was a statistically significant two thirds of a
stage. Expressed differently, 63$ of his students moved up one stage,
9$ moved up half a stage, and 26% remained about the same. Comparison
with three control groups (comprised of Turiel's experimental end two
control groups) of similar age, socio-economic background snd level of
moral development showed that changes in the latter ranged from -17 to
4-08 (e full stage change = 100) which was not statistically significant.
A one year follow-up post-test showed a slight, statistically insignif-
icant decline among both experimental and control groups. In effect,
the gains made by the Sunday School students held.
The success of this experimental teaching venture induced
Blatt to test his teaching techniques on a wider scale. His next study
took place in the Chicago area, in the sixth and tenth grades of two
public school systems which drew on a lower middle and lower class
population respectively. Blatt met with his students twice a week for
18, 45 minute periods. His teaching style was the same as in the
earlier experiment j the dilemmas were new ones, of his own invention,
which highlighted specific issues used in Kohlberg’s scoring methods
such as Law, Conscience, Property, Life, etc. Again the result was a
statistically significant upward movement in moral reasoning, as
measured by the Kohlberg scale, although not so dramatically as in
the
earlier experiment. In this case the mean score of the classes
was
only one third of a stage higher on the post-test and only 19$
increased one full stage. Among 80$ of the experimental group
there
was no significant change. Among those from different
socio-economic
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backgrounds, the sixth graders from the lower class population end the
tenth graders from the lower middle class gained the most, a 45 and 52
mean point increase respectively. Blatt offers no explanation why
this was so. Again the changes seemed to hold in a follow-up test done
two years later. However, although the differences between experimen-
tal and control groups are still significantly different, one inter-
esting phenomenon is that experimental group II (a group that had
discussed moral dilemmas among themselves with their regular teacher
present but not participating actively) had made up more than half the
difference between it and experimental group I. (Blatt 1 s guided
discussion group) . On the immediate post-test there was a 25 point
difference between the two groups. On the two year follow-up there
was only a 12 point difference. One wonders if a subsequent follow-up
would show any significant difference at all between the two groups.
Of particular interest, as far as classroom technique is con-
cerned, is Blatt' s highly interventive style. Typescripts of his
discussion show him taking up approximately half the air-time. In
addition his comments are often quite leading. He does not merely
facilitate discussion but directs it, focusing attention on what he
thinks is important. Here is an example from a discussion among sixth
grade lower middle class students about law (Blatt, 1973, Appendix A).
Student C: It's—there's not a law but—
Mr. B: What kind of law may be involved?
It'
s
not a legal law, although it may
be, it doesn't have to be. What kind
of law is it? What were you saying
about your mother? What did she say?
Student B: God's law.
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Mr. B: God's law. What does it say about
killing?
Student B: Thou shalt not kill.
Students B and F: God's law is moral law
Mr. B: What do you mean?
Student B: Cause this is the laws of his country
and God has moral laws for everybody.
Mr. B: Oh, so what you're saying is—did you
listen to what he's saying? Would you
repeat what you said? It's very
important.
Student B: God's law is for everyone and there's
different laws in different countries,
so God's law, his moral laws are for
everyone.
Student D: God's laws include more people than
down here, yes.
Mr. B: Now what you're saying is that God's
laws are for all people regardless of
where you live. And so, they're
universal laws, right? They're for
the whole universe is what you're
saying. All right. Now you said, from
the legal point of view he was right
(in refusing to lend his car to get a
seriously injured person to a hospital)
,
from a moral point of view he was wrong.
He had a legal right to refuse his
property but no moral right to do so.
Now what about Mr Jones? Was Mr. Jones
justified from a legal point of view
beating up the man and taking his car?
One gets the impression that Blatt knows where he is going and
the students are being led there. He cuts off a student in midsentence
and then focuses attention where he wants it:
"
—did you listen to
what he*
s
saying...? It's very important." As students grope for the
distinction between legal and moral, a very important insight, Blatt
takes the occasion to deliver a mini-lecture on the
distinction,
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introducing a new term "universal" in the process and then quickly
moves on to another question without stopping to see if indeed his
interpretation of what the student was saying was correct or if the
students had understood what he meant by universal laws.
In effect, in the initial attempt at a more democratic proce-
dure for teaching moral development, Blatt still betrays a rather
authoritarian approach to the classroom. His opinions obviously count
for more as he exercises his authority to talk about what he considers
important, apparently with only a minimal regard for whether or not
the majority of students are with him. It seems like the new wine of
the cognitive developmental approach is still contained within the old
wineskin of an authoritarian teaching style. Insofar as this was a
new experiment on Blatt* s part, it is certainly understandable that he
had difficulty making the transition from one style to another smoothly.
VJhat is less understandable, however, is that so many cognitive-
developmentalists continue to revere this teaching style as proto-
typically developmental.
Kohlberg, referring to a high school class participating in a
psychological education project, insists that, "these kids need a
course to develop the humanistic bag of virtues, to listen
to people’s
feelings, to express feelings, to be spontaneous, like
they need a
hole in the head" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 76). What he
apparently fails to
see is that being able to listen, to understand
and to empathize con-
tribute directly to the role-taking ability which
Kohlberg himself
holds to be one of the central dynamics of
moral development. In fair-
ness to him he is not contending that
children don't need these
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"virtues" but, rather, that they already possess them. But this is a
gratuitous assumption backed by no data. Children model adults.
Teachers who do not listen will beget students who do not listen.
The important lesson to be learned from all this is that
teachers need the skills to facilitate discussion in a non-authoritar-
ian way. This includes not only knowing where a student may have
placed on a moral maturity test but being sensitive in the here and
now of a discussion to what a student is attempting to articulate to
self and others out of his or her experience; it includes giving stu-
dents room to arrive at their own conclusions rather than preempting
that process to illustrate one's own convictions. Instruction may
remain as an important ingredient of moral education, even if it is
merely instruction in developmental process , but the pacing, of
instruction and the adapting of it according to the readiness of the
student to hear remains a crucial teaching skill to which thus far I
have seen the cognitive-developmentalists pay too little attention.
Finally movement toward a greater autonomy combined with
increased respect for others characteristic of democratic structures
and higher levels of moral maturity will not occur if teachers them-
selves behave autocratically in their classroom. The importance of
this has not been missed by Kohlberg, who, as we will see shortly,
insists on the need of a democratic structuring of both classroom
and school. However, he seems uncharacteristically blind to the
importance of the quality of the personal interaction between
teacher
and student without which any democratic structure will be
subverted,
qualities which he somewhat disparagingly refers to as the
humanistic
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bag of virtues.
2. Teacher Training
. Blatt attempted to teach children.
Marcia Mutterer-Mentkowski and Richard Hersh are developing curricula
to teach teachers. To my knowledge their curriculum has not been
tested experimentally to determine whether teachers taking their
course do themselves develop. Rather the focus in their courses has
been to teach developmental theory and to broaden the teacher's
repertoire of skills and techniques in teaching moral development.
They have developed four modules (Mentkowski and Hersh, 1975)
:
Module I introduces the teacher to some of the Piagetian concepts
•underlying Kohlberg's theory; Module II treats the stages of moral
development; Module III discusses procedures and techniques for
facilitating changes in moral reasoning: and Module IV considers the
moral atmosphere of the school as it relates to the creation of a
just community.
Unlike Blatt' s procedure with high school and younger students
which focused solely on discussing dilemmas, Mentkowski and Hersh seek
to provide their teacher-candidates with both an overview of moral
development theory and the practical experience of working in the
classroom and discussing their own personal dilemmas with
their peers.
Their approach, then, is considerably more sophisticated
and broader
in scope both in light of the greater maturity of
their students and
of the advance in moral development theory and
technique since Blatt'
s
earlier work. They appear to work on three levels.
1. Their curriculum for teachers involves a
heavily theoreti-
This includes extensive exposure to Piaget's
stage
cal component .
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theory of cognitive development (Module I); explanation of Kohlberg's
moral development theory and related research (Module II)
;
a compari-
son of values clarification theory with moral development theory and
description of various techniques and procedures for teaching moral
development (Module III) ; 8nd an extensive explanation of the just
community concept as presently being implemented in two schools and
a prison (Module IV).
2. The authors have attempted to integrate the theoretical
component of their course with a teacher 1 s practicum that includes
learning by doing. Thus for example the teachers are required to
administer Piagetian tasks concerning conservation of number, length,
area, etc., to their own students; to conduct moral dilemma discus-
sions and role-play with their students; using videotape to encourage
their students to identify classroom situations in which students or
the teacher "preach" about morality; to conduct "moral atmosphere"
interviews in the schools in which they are interning, personally
noting how decisions are msde, by whom, how punishments are meted out,
conducting their own rule-making sessions in the classroom, etc.
Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh provide no data indicating how
much teacher-candidates themselves develop morally as a result of
their course, however their multidimensional approach seems to
offer
greater promise of overall development than a unidimensional
approach
such as Blatt’s of simply discussing moral dilemmas.
The course
further recommends itself because it has no hidden agenda;
the teacher,
candidates know the aim of the course is both their own
development
and the acquisition of the ability to facilitate
moral development
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themselves.
There are two negative considerations however: 1) the
construction of the curriculum suggests that the primary objective
of the course is to create competent teachers of moral development.
The emphasis in terms of time and the focus of objectives seems to
be more on facilitating growth in others than in self. Most of the
exercises involve teacher-candidate activity in the practicum class-
room rather than interaction among themselves. Just as counselor
education all too often primarily emphasizes the acquisition of
counseling skills in order to help the counselee without paying
sufficient attention to the counselor as a person, so there seems to
be a similar trend in many attempts at psychological education such
as Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh's. If one conceives of education
as a direct transfusion of information from one body to another then
the personal presence of the teacher is of secondary importance. If,
however, education is conceived of as part of a relational process
affecting both "teacher" and "student" then the quality of that
interaction becomes very important. In psychotherapy counselor-
effectiveness depends less on the techniques used than on the coun-
selor 1 s ability to be present and aware of the counselee and of him
or her self in relation to the counselee in a relatively undistorted
way. So in psychological education, teachers need not only an
evaluative awareness of their students but also an awareness of how
their own interaction with students advances or retards the educa-
tional process. Teacher effectiveness depends less on how up-to-date
their educational techniques are or even on how just and fair the
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organization of their classroom or school is than it does on the
people who employ the techniques and operate within the organization.
Fairness and justice, respect for the other person and tolerance must
be values they have internalized and made their own. No technique or
structure will supply for that deficiency. Too little of the
Mutterer-Mentkowski-Hersh curriculum is devoted to the self exploration
and self evaluation among the teacher-candidates that will enable them
to teach with awareness rather than simply employing techniques.
2) A second criticism flows from the first. In seeming contra
diction to what I have just said, the teacher-candidates need to learn
more group process skills . However they should learn these not just
as techniques but first by experiencing as learners what it is like to
have a teacher who listens to them, respects their difficulties and
frustrations as learners and paces the presentation of materials
according to their relative readiness and ability to assimilate it.
Secondly, they would reflect upon what those qualities were, how
they were employed and how they affected themselves as learners.
Thirdly they would be given an opportunity to practice them, first on
each other with appropriate feedback and finally in their practicum
classroom. This process helps develop a genuine role-taking ability
rightfully considered so important by cognitive-developmentalists.
It consists of both the ability to project oneself into another
person’s experience and viewpoint and also to reverse the
process and
as it were, perceive oneself from the other person’s
viewpoint with a
concrete awareness of one’s own impact on others. This
ability,
however, differs from Selman's (1976) conception of
role-taking
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insofar as it does not rely so much on an abstract, deductive ability
to "figure out" what the other's viewpoint is as it is an on-going
process skill which utilizes awareness and finely honed intuition
fully as much as rational consciousness. Selman's role-taking ability
which is highly useful in itself, requires a certain amount of
distance, emotional neutrality and time to reflect. The process skill
I am speaking of is immediate and frequently based on feelings but
clearly differentiates between one's own feelings and viewpoint and
those of the other. It is not empathy in the commonly understood
sense of feeling for or with someone else for one clearly distin-
guishes and cognitively affirms the distinction between one's own
position, viewpoint and feeling state and that of the other.
3. The Just Community . Fairly early on Kohlberg realized
that moral education within the classroom would be ineffective if it
ran counter to the morality implicitly taught through the structure
and administration of the school (the hidden curriculum) . Viewed
more positively he reasoned that if these two could be synchronized,
assuming that they both embodied developmental principles, then they
would become powerful tools for moral development.
A first attempt at this, as mentioned in Chapter two, was in
a single cottage in a female correctional institution (later expanded
to include both sexes). There, by means of regular community
meetings, prisoners were given the responsibility to determine policy
issues, to decide on disciplinary action when rules were violated and
generally to administer the running of the cottage conjointly with
the staff on a one person, one vote basis (Kohlberg, Scharf and
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Hickey, 1972).
The origin of the rules whereby the cottage was run was a
"constitutional convention" at which prisoners and staff hammered out
a commonly agreed on set of rules which both would live by. This was
a long and harrowing process characterized by much mistrust on both
sides. However, it was considered crucial that all concerned should
have a say in the rules by which they would be governed.
Along with the creation of a democratic atmosphere at the
cottage and a consistent concern for a fair administration of the
rules, prisoners were also engaged in small group discussion of moral
dilemmas. Focus soon moved from abstract dilemmas, such ss those used
by Blatt, to personal issues confronting participants both within the
prison and "in the street." Unlike the former, these personal dilemmas
generated considerable feeling among the participants. During a visit
to the cottage I observed a very heated discussion about the right of
prisoners to have sexual relations with each other (the cottage was in
the early stages of forming a community comprised of both sexes) . The
issue appeared unresolvable on the cottage level since a general
prison rule forbade sexual contact among prisoners.
Scharf (1974) reports that early results indicated that the
mean moral maturity scores of the prisoners rose about one third of
a
stage (39 points) a little more than twice (17 points) that
of an oral
discussion group not involved in the cottage democracy. Two other
control groups showed almost no change (control woman's prison,
-2
point; control men's prison + 2 points). About one half
of the
original experimental group had been released from
prison and about a
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year later there had been no recidivism (Kohlberg, Scharf and Hickey,
1972)
.
Subsequently Kohlberg and co-workers applied the moral atmos-
phere principle to the establishment of "experimental just schools"
in Massachusetts and California.
The Cambridge, Massachusetts school began with 60 students
and 7 teachers. Its curriculum focuses on social science and math.
Students attend regular high schools for the remainder of their
courses. Like the prison community, students and staff drew up a
governing constitution. Compulsory weekly community meetings are
held to discuss proposals which are implemented by a simple majority
vote. There are, in addition small group sessions that prepare
proposals for the larger community meetings, including disciplinary
procedures for rule-breakers, new policies, etc. Other small groups
provide counseling, staff training and mini-courses.
The Irvine, California school consists of 7 teachers and
200 students. Coursework focuses on interdisciplinary studies and
frequently involves fieldwork in some sort of community education
project. There are three levels of formalized social interaction in
the school. Small interpersonal groups meet daily. From these
groups
and from the school at-large, students are elected to a
representative
council which has disciplinary authority. Regularly held
community
meetings can override decisions made by the representative
council
(Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh, 1975).
A difference in organization and curriculum
of the two schools
creates a slight difference in the students' focus
of attention.
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Because of their involvement in field work, the Irvine students found
themselves confronted with moral dilemmas in the world outside the
school. The Cambridge students, on the other hand, found their moral
dilemmas in the actual running of their own school.
Again statistics concerning the growth of the students in these
experimental schools are not available at this writing. One would
expect, however, at least as great an upward movement as in the prison-
experiment reported earlier. All these attempts to restructure the
learning environment so that it embodies as nearly as possible the
just community talked about in moral discussions, and provides multiple
role-taking opportunities in real life situations, represent a real
advance over the "canned discussion" formula of earlier attempts at
moral education. Justice and the problems inherent in administering it
need to be experienced on a first-hand basis, not simply talked about.
It follows then, that teachers committed to moral education need,
along with familiarity with moral theory, an ability to plan and
perhaps to moderate the constitutional process whereby a given educa-
tional institution sets a system of justice in motion. Teachers might
profitably look at the procedures followed by a town-meeting moderator
to learn some of these skills. In addition they would need what
students of group dynamics call "process skills." In general, these
consist of an ability to monitor the interpersonal climate of a
given
group, to determine its emotional tone, where the genuine
interest and
energy of the group lies, where it is being blocked
or dissipated and
how, and to call the attention of the group to
issues they may be
avoiding which may be subverting the accomplishment
of their goals.
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In short, the skilled process person maintains a delicate balance
between the human processes activated by any group meeting and the
overt goal or agenda of that meeting and he or she attempts to teach
the same skill to the participants.
My impressionistic observation of the cognitive-developmen-
talists both as they met among themselves at a 1974 conference and as
an observer of the just community prison was that most of their process
skills were procedural a la Robert* s Rule of Order rather than
personal. At both meetings feelings ran high among participants and in
neither case were they explicitly acknowledged. Rather, repeated
attempts were made to maintain discussion at a "problem-solving*' cogni-
tive level, attempts which bogged down because of a growing backlog of
unattended feelings. In the latter instance, while the group leaders
avoided some of the emotional excesses that some Synanon type thera-
peutic communities fall prey to, they seemed at the same time somewhat
bewildered by the raw feelings of the prisoners and unsure about how
to deal with them.
In this instance as with the Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh
curriculum, more emphasis needs to be placed on teacher formation.
There is no such thing as a good curriculum without a good teacher
to
implement it. And good teachers need not only to master the material
but also the very human process of teaching it.
B. Humanistic-Developmental Approaches to Education
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1. Deliberate Psychological Education . The educational goal
of Deliberate Psychological Education is "to make personal development
a central focus of education..." (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971).
Sprinthall, Mosher and other proponents of this approach draw heavily
on cognitive-developmental psychology for their theoretical orienta-
tion to education; however, their actual teaching practice more
closely resembles a humanistic approach in the tradition of Rogers and
Maslow. They have hypothesized that by teaching high school students
counseling skills and involving them in a counseling practicum, they
could raise the latters’ developmental level as measured by the
Kohlberg and Loevinger scales. For Sprinthall and Mosher, the course
content is less important than the impact on the students' overall
growth and development. They arrived at this conclusion from their
own experience (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971, pp. 15-16):
Having taught counselor education at the graduate level for
seven years, we realized that the seminar and practicum
experiences in counseling were powerful tools for raising
questions of personal identity, the meaning of a helping
relationship, understanding one's self and others in
comprehensive ways, the complexity of hearing and responding
to another person's ideas and feelings, the importance of
emotions etc. ...There is little question that the impact
of such experiences in counseling and supervision can
promote personal growth for the counselor (and hopefully,
too, for the client).
Thus, with Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) they see development
as
not only structural (through successive stages) but also
content
oriented (through the acquisition of better interpersonal
shills
such as the ability to listen and to respond
appropriately). The
authors' goal then was not to turn out a whole
bevy of junior
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counselors but to stimulate personal development.
Mosher and Sprinthall's first attempt at psychological edu-
cation was at a public high school in Newton, Massachusetts. They
offered a course in counseling, one of several electives in psychology
from which students could choose. Since more than 800 of the school's
1700 population had elected courses in psychology, 24 students were
randomly assigned to the experimental group and 24 to a control.
Both groups were pre and post-tested using the Kohlberg moral develop-
ment and the Loevinger ego development scales.
The format of the counseling course consisted of three phases.
In phase one (which lasted six weeks) students engaged in role-play
counseling. They alternated playing the role of counselor and client,
tape recording the proceedings. Once a week they met as a class for
three hours with the instructors to play and critique the tapes.
Phase two involved an unplanned shift. As students became
more comfortable with each other, they stopped making up issues to
discuss and began sharing real-life problems with each other . The
instructors feared that this unplanned phase might initiate "an
unending orgy of self—reference" but instead they "found the students
swinging back and forth between their own internal frame of reference
and the frame of reference of others" (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971,
p. 25). During this phase students were able to articulate some of
their uniquely adolescent problems to sympathetic peers, often for the
first time. In a class discussion of a practicum in which she had
played the role of counselor, one student articulated her own and
her
peers' feelings, (Ibid . , p. 25)?
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I just feel there are so many changes going on within me
and there are so many changes going on within kids my age,
you know, and I can't find this stabilizing thing, you
know. It’s just like shifting and moving and it'll settle
down, you know; but at this point, it's just so scary, it's
so drifting and lost, you know.
In the third phase the students began to counsel other
students in the high school. This was worked out through the guid-
ance department, who let it be known that some high school seniors
had taken a special program in counseling and were available, under
supervision, to talk with juniors who might have questions or concerns
about college, job choices, senior course selection or other decisions.
Class work during this phase consisted in reviewing tapes of actual
sessions as had been done during the earlier phases. Issues discussed
during this time included confidentiality, confrontation versus clari-
fying responses and avoiding "phony encouragement" and "put downs."
Post-tests administered at the end of the one semester course
indicated a l/3 stage change (from 3.22 to 3.56) on the Kohlberg scale.
Of the 18 students taking the post-test, seven moved upward on the
scale, nine remained the same and two regressed. Most movement was
from Stage three, (the modal stage) to Stage four. The overall upward
movement, however, while suggestive, was statistically significant
only at the .08 level. There was no change in the control group.
For the Loevinger ego development pre and post-test scores
there was a significant upward movement of the experimental group
mean
from delta 3 to 3/4. The former stage is characterized as
"wary
,
self-protective, opportunistic conformism;" the former as
"conscien-
tious concern for communication, self-respect and
conceptual complex-
ity." The control group remained at delta /3
throughout the semester.
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Several other variations of the Deliberate Psychological
Education model have been attempted. Atkins (Mosher and Sprinthall,
1971) reports on the use of high school students to teach elementary
school students with teacher supervision. The high school students
met weekly to discuss assigned readings in education and group-process
skills and to share their experiences in the teaching practicum.
The pre and post-test results were ambiguous. The Kohlberg
test showed a non-significant -4- stage increase while the Loevinger
test showed a slight decrease in the post test—not an uncommon phenom-
enon as Loevinger herself has reported.
Still other variations were the teaching of improvisational
drama, a course in child development, including a practicum in a
nursery and peer counseling in the inner city . None of these provided
developmental test data at the time of publication (1971) • They repre-
sented, however, imaginative approaches to psychological education.
Sprinthall and Erickson, (1974) have continued similar experi-
ments in the Minneapolis public school system with approximately the
same results. In a course called "The Psychology of Counseling"
about
the same syllabus was followed as in the course in counseling
described
above. The students were taught the five point active-listening
scale, were assigned readings in communications and viewed
the Gloria
films ("Three Approaches to Psychotherapy") counseling segments
by
Rogers, Peris end Ellis. In addition they practiced
counseling with
each other which, as before, soon focused on real
rather than role-
played problems.
The authors assert that there was an upward
movement on the two
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developmental scales employed but do not specify results. They are
more specific about a women' s study course offered to high school
sophomore girls. The students were taught listening and interviewing
skills prior to their field work which partially consisted of inter-
viewing women across the life span. In role-play situations they
learned how to ask Piaget type interview questions to gather data
from their interviews. In addition, in seminar meetings, they were
taught to analyze responses according to developmental criteria such
as complexity of thought, differentiated feeling statements, etc.
To supplement the live interviews the students also studied women in
literature and from a developmental viewpoint examined such personali-
ties as the 16 year old eponymous heroine of Sophocles' Antigone ,
Nora in Ibsen's A Doll ' s House , and Katherine in The Taming of the
Shrew
,
etc.
Post-test results indicated a statistically significant upward
movement on the Loevinger scale from Stage 3 (conformist) and Stage
3/4 (transition from conformist to conscientious) toward Stage 4
(conscientious and even to Stage 4/5 transition toward autonomous)
•
As in the other studies,’ the post-test using the Kohlberg scale was
less impressive. There was approximately a l/3 stage increase, from
Stage 3 toward Stage 4, of the group mean, which was
significant,
however, only at the .07 level. A control group composed of
students
from regular high school classes evidenced no change in
either
Loevinger or Kohlberg scores.
The difference in results between the Kohlberg and the
Loevinger tests may be attributable to two things.
First, the course
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content in several of these projects appears to focus on the more
generic concept of ego development than on moral development.
Listening for greater conceptual complexity, clearer articulation of
feelings etc., more closely resembles Loevinger's stage descriptions
than Kohlberg 1 s. Secondly, Kohlberg (1976) continues to insist that
ego and moral stages are distinct. He asserts that, "to treat moral
development as simply a facet of ego. . .development is to miss many
of its special problems and features. .. .The higher the moral stage,
the more distinct it is from the parallel ego stage" (Kohlberg, 1976,
p. 53). Hence, at least up to a point, ego development may be
possible without a concomitant growth in moral development.
Deliberate Psychological Education represents an interesting
and, to my mind, encouraging shift in emphasis when compared with the
other attempts at developmental education outlined thus far. It has
focused on the growth of the potential teacher as its primary goal
rather than on imparting skills. This is not to imply that skill
development was ignored or even minimized. Various measures not
reported here, such as those developed by Carkhuff, (1971) indicated
real counseling skill acquisition. However, the purpose of the
various courses remained: to foster the development of the partici-
pants. The various authors do not discuss whether they think this
approach is appropriate only on the high school level where de facto
their focus was or whether this should indeed be the goal of teacher
and counselor education on the college and graduate level. I
contend
that it would indeed be appropriate. It is the development
of the
whole teacher or counselor that makes him or her effective.
The
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beauty of the deliberate psychological education approach is that it
demonstrates that fostering development and teaching skills need not
be mutually exclusive educational objectives. In fact, at least in
education for human services, the two are complementary. The D.P.E.
approach, however, does leave some doubt as to its effectiveness in
fostering moral development. Perhaps a more explicit focus on this
facet of development than has thus far been attempted is required.
2. Confluent Moral Education . Picetti and Au, (1974) have
borrowed the expression confluent education from George I. Brown,
(1971) for their approach to moral education. They have not presented
a curriculum as such but rather a series of suggestions as to the
areas on which a curriculum should focus. They criticize many moral
educators, especially the contributors to the Toronto Conference on
moral education (Beck, Crittenden and Sullivan, 1971) for, "an obvious,
disproportionate focus on the cognitive/rational components of moral
behavior with the unfortunate consequence of neglecting an in-depth
discussion of the affective dimensions of moral behavior" (Picetti and
Au, 1974, p. 16). In attempting to remedy the deficit they draw not
only on the work of Brown, (1971) but also on that of May, (1969),
Wilson, (1969), Peris, (1972) and Assagioli, (1971).
I will mention, only in passing, several areas treated by them
in which more attention might fruitfully be focused.
Unconscious motivation . Following Gustafson, (1970) , they
define as unconscious motivation "those presumably ’real'
determinants
of behavior which underlie and often are different from the
reasons we
give for our actions" (Picetti and Au, 1974, p. 19). The
authors
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suggest that it is not within the purview of education to attempt to
delve deep into the unconscious. However, there is an unconscious
"layer" that is phenomenologically nearer the surface of consciousness
which can be profitably mined by education. The Gestalt awareness
continuum, the guided fantasies of psychosynthesis, artwork, role-
plays, dance, to name but a few means, can raise to the level of
awareness aspects of our personalities including half-realized needs,
goals and desires of which we were previously unaware. Greater aware-
ness brings with it greater freedom and responsibility (i.e., the
ability to respond) and expands the moral dimension of our lives.
Greater awareness moves naturally from the level of cognition to the
level of conation and bridges to some extent the artificial dichotomy
sometimes set up between the two.
Rollo May's, (1969)
,
somewhat popular explanation of the
phenomenologists ' concept of intentionality attempts to conceptualize
this. Intentionality refers to the natural appetite of the human mind
that carries it toward Being. Knowing something is not merely
beholding it statically from afar; the act of knowing causes us to
enter into relationship with the objects of our knowledge. We are
inclined in their direction—hence the "knowing" of the bible refers
to sexual intercourse. Intentionality then is not only the dynamism
of knowing as originally defined by the phenomenologists but also the
dynamism of action and includes the latter in its very definition.
However, "intending" something is not merely a conscious,
intellectual function. The conscious and unconscious aspects of our
personalities are possessed of their own dynamisms and spontaneous
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"intentions," often in conflict with one another. One of the goals
of a moral education of the "unconscious" could be to assist the
student to bring these various dynamisms into fuller awareness—to
"befriend" the inner world, as Picetti and Au happily express it
(p. 61)—in order to utilize the energy latent in them. The tech-
niques of Gestalt Therapy are particularly well suited to help
mediate the often-conflicting claims and values of the many polari-
ties in our personalities once they are raised to awareness and to
unify and direct our psychic energy system toward our self-chosen
goals.
Belief is another relatively unexplored aspect of moral edu-
cation. The authors use Ausubel's definition of belief as "a genuine
conviction, a disposition to behave in a certain way that is consonant
with underlying thought and feeling" (Ausubel, 1971, p. 212). Genuine
belief involves emotional and intellectual conviction and thus has a
large affective component. Many beliefs, of course, are unexamined
and frequently we are unaware of their influence on our actions.
These can range from a belief, perhaps inherited from childhood experi-
ences, that the world will never supply our material and emotional
needs to a belief in an all-loving God. If either is a genuinely held
belief it will certainly influence the way we act in moral crises. The
former may cause one to act with "immoral" selfishness even against
one's own conscience or moral judgment. The latter too may stimulate
action that does not fit "normal" moral categories of thought.
One
can also see that this category parallels somewhat some of
the thought
already outlined in Chapter three. A spirituality always
involves a
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set of convictions which are not always logically defensible (though
they may be) and include a profound affective component.
A moral education, then, that explores beliefs will have to
find a way of reconciling beliefs as they affect our actions and our
personal moral philosophies. Insofar as beliefs are unconscious or
unexamined they will have to be brought into awareness, not neces-
sarily for cold, intellectual analysis but in vivo
,
with their affect
intact to see how they interact with, corroborate, or contradict our
more "rational" (so we think) moral philosophies.
There are several means for dealing with both unconscious
motivations and beliefs. Assagioli, (1971), for example, outlines
six stages of the will (no relation to Kohlberg's stages) and
related techniques which, he claims aids in the explication snd inte-
gration of our unconscious motives, desires and beliefs into a
comprehensive lived value system. He begins with an exploration of
the unconscious and a deliberate valuing of its contents; a decision
process follows, based on a clearer concept of one's values and a
realization that choosing frequently means excluding some things of
relatively less value; based on one's faith or conviction one then
affirms that one's choice is worthwhile and valuable; one next plans
the execution of one's choice which involves pre-visualizing, fore-
seeing intermediate steps, etc; the final step is the direction of
execution which requires energy and persistence.
As one becomes increasingly more aware of one's unconscious
motivations and beliefs and explores their implications, it is
extremely helpful to have a structure or system to moke sense out
of
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them. On a theoretical-cognitive level, a knowledge of Kohlberg's
stages could help one identify and locate some of the moral elements.
On a more personal level the use of the Trumpet developed by Gerald
Weinstein (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970; Weinstein, 1973) provides a
systematic process to enable one to inventory and explore the effects
of a given belief or motivation on oneself, to explore and evaluate
alternatives with a view to making self-aware choices. Weinstein's
trumpet provides a more systematic way of deciding than does Assagioli
and could profitably be integrated with the latter's "will theory."
Kohlberg's "plus one match" approach could also be used with the
trumpet when considering alternatives. In such a case, the teacher or
facilitator would not only ask clarifying questions to assist the
learner to generate alternatives, but also would pose moral consider-
ations (when appropriate) and on occasion challenge the learner's
thinking from a higher developmental level.
Picetti and Au then broaden the area of moral consideration to
embrace conative, affective and unconscious elements of the person-
ality more than any of the systems reviewed so far. They continue to
respect the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education but
are aware of its limitations and attempt to remedy them. They use a
shot gun approach, however, and give little indication how their
suggestions might be incorporated systematically into a curriculum.
3. An Experiment in Moral Education . A final example of an
attempt to combine the cognitive-developmental approach with a human-
istic orientation is an experimental class which John Piwko (1975),
and I taught to a group of first year college men and women
at a small
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midwestern Catholic college. Unlike Mosher and Sprinthall, our course
focused directly on the teaching of moral development. Our students
were participants in a human development program entitled Basic Seminar
in Human Development. As part of their curriculum they attended twice
weekly "support groups" facilitated by graduate students working under
staff supervision during which the students were encouraged to discuss
whatever personal issues the college experience was creating for them.
Piwko and I theorized that, as important as these groups were, they
alone were insufficient to stimulate moral development. We therefore
undertook to design a moral development "seminar" consisting of ten
two-hour seminars which would utilize a small group format, but which
would also consist of structured experiences as well as the presenta-
tion of moral development theory. We wanted to combine an objective,
content orientation with an invitation to explore some of the students'
personal feelings around such areas as guilt, duty to parents and
authority, peer pressure, etc. We thus hoped to overcome the dichotomy
between thinking and feeling that has afflicted moral education. We
felt justified in attempting this somewhat risky undertaking because
the students were accustomed to "dealing with feelings" in their
support groups.
To test our hypothesis we offered our course to Basic Seminar
students as an elective on a first-come basis. We accepted 15 stu-
dents. We formed two control groups, one consisting of 15 Basic
Seminar students chosen randomly from a pool of 30 (control group l)
;
the other (control group 2) consisted of 15 students from a regular
freshman psychology course, none of whom were Basic Seminar
students.
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All three groups took the Defining Issues Test of Moral
Judgment (DIT) developed by James Rest (1974, 1975), an objective
test of moral judgment based on Kohlberg. The DIT consists of six
dilemma stories. Using a Likert-type scale, subjects are asked to
evaluate the importance of 12 issue-statements for each story in terras
of their relative importance in resolving the dilemma. They then rank
what they believe to be the four most important issue-statements. The
DIT yields a "P" or principled score which can be expressed as a
percentage ranging from zero to 95. The "P" score expresses what
weight the subject attributes to principled issue-statements (state-
ments expressing Stage 5 end 6 thinking) in resolving the dilemmas.
The DIT, therefore, does not yield a stage score but only indicates
what importance subjects attribute to principled thinking. It is
based on the assumption that Stage 2 subjects, for example, will give
less weight to principled thinking than Stage 3 subjects, Stage 3
subjects less weight than Stage 4 subjects, etc. An increase in the
"P" score of a subject would imply developmental movement toward
principled thinking.
All three groups were re-tested upon completion of the semi-
nar. Since an equivalent forms version of the DIT was not available
at the time, the same version was used as on the pre-test. Scoring
was done by a computer.
The actual conducting of the seminar can perhaps best be
described according to the somewhat artificial distinction between
structure and content.
The structure of the seminar was thst of a modified small
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group. The atmosphere was relaxed. Except when films were shown,
teachers and students sat on the floor or used cushions in a small
room where group sessions were frequently held. Free interchanges
between teachers and students took place and students were encouraged
to express their feelings as well as their ideas, a function which
the teachers attempted to model. In regular evaluation sessions held
throughout the duration of the seminar students were also encouraged
to express their needs and expectations. Although the teachers had
drawn up a preliminary outline of the course content, adjustments
were continually made on the basis of the on-going evaluation process.
The teachers found that they tended to present more theoretical mate-
rial than the students could assimilate at one time. In general the
latter requested more time to digest the material and to relate it to
their own experience.
The students took part with relative alacrity in relaxation
exercises and discussions. The ease with which they did this is at
least partly attributable to approximately two months' prior experi-
ence in small groups which they had been motivated enough to elect.
In this regard they were probably not typical first-year college
students. Piwko and I hope, however, that some of the enthusiasm
with which the students participated in the seminar can be attributed
to the care taken in structuring the seminar so that participants
were listened to and encouraged to express their feelings. They
also saw that changes were made in format in response to
their feed-
back.
The course content focused on (a) the presentation
of
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developmental theory, (b) the presentation of some social issues in
the light of developmental theory, and (c) exploration of personal
reactions and feelings to moral issues. A format followed in most
of the seminar was the exposure to an experience, e.g., a film or an
exercise; the processing of the experience (what did you think? feel?
do?) and a recording of the reactions in a notebook; snd a mixture of
theory snd discussion to make some sense out of the experience. For
example, in session 8, a half hour condensed version of A Man for All
Seasons was shown. Students were then asked to discuss and record in
their journals their personal reactions to the film. In addition
they were asked to reflect on their own lives to see if there were
values they would put their lives on the line for. Finally, on a more
theoretical basis, they were asked to estimate what stage of moral
thinking several different characters in the film seemed to be acting
from (by this time Kohlberg 1 s stage theory had been discussed in some
detail)
.
The presentation of developmental theory included a discussion
of the various ways of teaching morality as discussed in the first
chapter. Also included was an explanation of Kohlberg 1 s stage theory.
Opportunity was provided to discuss and role-play moral dilemmas.
Some of the social issues explored derived from Milgram'
s
(1974), experiments regarding obedience to authority. An exploration
of racism was initiated by viewing a film on the Nazi concentration
camps and led to a self assessment of racial attitudes among the
seminar participants themselves. Attitudes regarding violence,
its
acceptance and portrayal in society, were investigated as
a result
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of an out-of-class assignment to view A Clockwork Oranre which was
showing on campus at the time.
In all these presentations and discussions the students were
brought back to reflect on their own attitudes, feelings and values.
This exploration of personal feelings and reactions was fostered
through regular journal entries during and after class time, through
discussion and confrontation of differing viewpoints among partici-
pants and by structured exercises.
One such exercise involved a guided fantasy during which the
students were asked to allow an image to form at the mention of the
word "conscience." One student describes his experience:
I opened my vision with only a yellow background.
Across this background moved a dark object too fuzzy
to be deciphered. Slowly, this object moved in my
general direction till it finally stopped only a short
distance from me. It was nothing but a big, blsck,
jagged rock out of which resounded a nonsensical voice.
I stood there in its shadow staring at it in a defiant
manner, while it appears to examine me. .. .Shortly there-
after the image faded into a dark background and the
fantasy ended. Little need be said regarding how I
apparently feel toward my top dog (conscience). Defiance
sums it up well.
A better representation of conscience as alien and heteron-
omous could scarcely be imagined. The student, an eager learner,
pleasant and almost too agreeable, in other words well-socialized,
was getting in touch with the suppressed part of himself that wanted
to defy the conventions which at some level speak only gibberish to
him. It appears that, although the student would probably score at
the conventional level on Kohlberg's scale, there persists an
unsocial-
ized residue, the "shadow" of which Jung and Neumann speak,
in revolt
against social convention and being a "good boy."
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In another fantasy exploring the source of their moral
injunctions students imagined: a first grade nun waggling her finger,
Jesus saying "relax," a woman intervening to stop one man from stabbing
another, a crowd of friends and a young man named "Be Moral" trying in
vain to get their attention. As time permitted, students role-plsyed
the various parts of their fantasies to identify and explore them
further. Their final report on the seminar indicated that many of them
sensed the splits in themselves both between the moral set they had
been raised to follow and were now questioning, and between idealized
actions they presently envisioned and their ability to implement them.
As one student wrote pithily: "Somehow it seems easier to 'die 1 for a
cause than to 'have one's head cut off' for a cause. Somehow it seems
easier to say you will do one than the other, even though they are
both the same."
The results of the post-test indicated that the experimental
group has increased its "P" score by 8.05$, from 44.72$ to 52.77$
which was significant at the .05 level. Control group one, students in
the Basic Seminar in Human Development but not participants in the
moral development seminar, increased 1.53$ from 45.55$ to 47.08$.
Control group two, students in a first-year psychology class decreased
.83$ from 39.44$ to 38.61$. In neither control group was the change
significant.#
The seminar raised more issues than it solved. In written
and oral feedback at its conclusion, the majority of participants
expressed regret that the seminar was over. They especially wanted to
#For further statistical analysis see Piwko, 1974, or summary
in Appendix.
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explore more personal moral issues. As a result a second seminar was
organized which focused on personal moral issues. This seminar was
not included in our statistical study. Its format W8S less formal
than the first but generally followed the formula of providing a
stimulating event, usually a structured exercise, followed by an oppor-
tunity to process what each participant experienced during the event.
Finally, individuals volunteered or requested time to explore an issue
that the initial stimulus or an occurrence outside had touched off.
The dividing line between this seminar and a therapy group is
very thin. The main difference was that the participants came to the
11 seminar" with a theoretical orientation in moral development from
the first seminar and that they worked on issues that had specifically
moral implications for them.
A year and a half later a follow-up questionnaire was sent to
all participants in the moral development seminar to determine what
effect, if any, the seminar had had on their every day lives. Only
six of the fifteen participants replied. Reactions varied—four
reported that when it came to making moral decisions they believed
that they were more aware of the importance of following their own
judgment and experience over against just doing what a rule dictates.
As one put it:
I do not place such an emphasis on rules. I tried to
see beyond rules. I take the situation that I am in
as a special circumstance.
Another said that the course "at first made me very bitter—
it made me challenge a lot of my so-called "values" and "morals.
Another said that the seminar enabled him to balance an
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objective appraisal of a situation against the "human element"
involved
.
From these replies, as well as from the self-reports submitted
at the end of the course, there is little doubt that the course
genuinely affected the participants' thinking, influencing them in
the direction of greater flexibility and tolerance of ambiguity.
Evidence however, that the seminar had a direct influence on moral
actions is much more ambiguous. Two of the six students who replied
listed several activities (fasting from one meal to donate the
proceeds to Guatemalan earthquake victims, working with the mentally
retarded, etc.) in which they became involved subsequent to the course
but these, of course, cannot be attributed directly to the seminar
itself. Two others expressed doubt that the seminar influenced their
subsequent actions at all. All six respondents, on the other hand,
believe that in one way or another the seminar (some times combined
with other experiences) has influenced the way they relate to other
people. Most make such comments as "putting myself in another's
shoes" more often, being more accepting of others' ideas, standing up
for one's own beliefs more, etc. One student remarks that she feels
more negatively about people but is unsure if that is as a result of
the seminar or not'.
Though these replies cannot be considered more than anecdotal,
they suggest that the seminar did have a positive impact on
the
thinking and attitudes of the participants. However, they also
suggest
that in order to affect moral actions a more comprehensive
approach is
required than a single course offering.
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Conclusion
. It is apparent from this brief overview of
moral education that many innovations have occurred since Blatt's
work in a Jewish Sunday School. It also appears that developmental
and humanistic approaches to education can work hand-in-hand to
produce involving and effective curricula. No curriculum, however,
is teacher-proof. A common variable of all the studies reviewed here
is that all the courses were taught by highly skilled teachers.
Concomitant, then, with the development of curricula should be compre-
hensive training of teachers. In the chapter that follows I will
outline a teacher training program which will include the salient
features of the best attempts at developmental education. In line
with the overall orientation of this work I will endeavor to include
a segment on spirituality as well.
CHAPTER V
A DEVELOPMENTAL CURRICULUM FOR TEACHERS
In Chapter four I reviewed some of the attempts to design
developmental curricula. I observed that with the exception of that
of Mentkowski-Hersh, all the curricula were aimed at young people.
It was apparently assumed that the teachers themselves possessed the
requisite skills to teach development successfully. There is a
certain logic in this. In the design of an experimental curriculum
one naturally focuses on the people one wishes to teach rather than
' oneself, the teacher. However, as in physics, one must ultimately
consider the effect of the observer on the thing observed; even more
so in teaching one must be cognizant of the impact of the teacher in
the classroom. The quality of the teacher-student interaction will
depend a great deal on the personality and formation of the teacher.
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the level of development
of the teacher will serve as a limit to the potential development of
the student.
In this final chapter, then, I outline a curriculum for
teachers aimed at fostering their own development. In this, it differs
from Mentkowski and Hersh, It resembles theirs in that it does not
rest content with fostering development; it is also designed to
impart
specific teaching skills which in turn will aid the development of
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students. Research in Deliberate Psychological Education indicates
that teaching certain skills in itself facilitates the development
of the learner.
Goal of the Curriculum
. The goal of the developmental curric-
ulum for teachers, then, is twofold. First, it is to facilitate the
holistic development of teachers so that they, in turn, will more
effectively aid the development of their students. Two of the pri-
mary foci of this first goal are moral and spiritual value development.
The second goal is to equip teachers with the knowledge,
skills and techniques to foster development in others.
Research supports the contention that short-term interventions
seldom have long-term effects. This curriculum, therefore, would
extend over a fairly long period of time (a minimum of two years)
.
Preferably the several modules envisioned would be interspersed
throughout a long-term teacher-training program. It would be impor-
tant however, that all the modules be integrated under a comprehensive
viewpoint so that each would contribute in its own way to overall
development.
Method
The method would proceed along three fronts. First (not
necessarily in chronological order) , would be the teaching of theory
and cognitive skills. Students, for example, would familiarize them-
selves with Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development. They
would do so both by reading and lecture but also more experiential ly
by experimenting with some of Piaget's learning tasks and adminis-
tering them to others. Secondly students would be involved in
H2
"laboratory” or personal growth experiences. They would wrestle with
Kohlbergian moral dilemmas themselves; they would struggle with the
practical problems and frustrations of a "constitutional convention"
to develop guidelines for their own learning community; they would
meet in small support groups and develop process skills with each
other before attempting to assume a teacher’s role with others.
Thirdly they would be involved in practicum experiences.
Like Mosher and Sprinthall’s students they might do supervised coun-
seling to develop further their process skills; they might intern at
a "just school" or alternate between participating 8nd/or observing
a "just prison community" model and a "therapeutic community" model
to compare the two.
Ideally the students would be continuously reinforcing experi-
ence with cognitive constructs, and adapting cognitive constructs to
match their experience in a progressive spiral of assimilation and
accommodation.
Keeping in mind the overall goals of the curriculum and that
these three teaching orientations would be employed throughout, let
us now survey several essential modules of a comprehensive develop-
mental curriculum.
1. Developmental Theory . This module would familiarize
students with some of the developmental theories. These would
include:
Piaget’s cognitive stage theory,
Kohl berg' s moral stage theory, including his raeta ethical
"Stage 7."
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Loevinger's ego stage theory,
Erikson's psychosocial stage theory.
As mentioned earlier, students would be expected not only to
be able to describe the various developmental theories but also to
perform some of the cognitive tasks associated with them. They may
for example, generate responses prototypical of given stages,
construct dilemmas highlighting certain issues in moral development,
analyze and score the responses to various developmental problems,
or examine their own lives, via structured exercises, to determine
developmental issues they are presently confronting, etc.
2. The "Just Community 11 . Included here would be an exami-
nation of the social structures which promote justice particularly
in a learning community. A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (1971),
might serve as a theoretical base but an historical review of
various attempts to found humane societies from the Greek city state
down to the latest adventures in communal living would also be
advantageous.
On the experiential level, students would be included in the
governing of their own learning community according to the principles
of justice. In addition, they would be provided an opportunity to
observe and to analyze other social environments through practicum
assignments and the use of Kohlberg's Moral Atmosphere Interview.
3. Process Skills and Their Application to Teaching . This
module ought to be taught early in the curriculum sequence because
process skills can be employed effectively at virtually every
stage
of the teaching-learning cycle particularly while
interviewing,
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leading discussions, during community meetings, etc. This is also
the area that nearly all moral development curriculum designers over-
look.
Process refers to the ebb and flow of awarenesses, feelings
8nd actions which characterize any human interaction. It is usually
distinguished from the overt agenda or "content" of the same inter-
action, e.g., discussing an amendment to a motion, teaching the forms
of irregular Greek verbs, talking about my relationship with my wife.
Unless otherwise directed, most of our attention focuses on the
content. Yet the energy and dynamism of human interactions derives
from the process. Process skills enable a teacher to monitor the
flow of an interchange, identify blocks, and periodically to focus
the awareness of participants on what is helping or hindering the
completion of their agenda. In addition to logical processes, the
skilled process person respects feelings and emotions and knows how
to utilize the energy of the latter constructively.
One of the most common complaints about moral development
theory is its inability to integrate affect into its structure. On
a practical level this is reflected in exclusively content-oriented
teaching styles. This module, therefore, is included as a partial
remedy for this lack.
George Brown* s Human Teaching for Human Learning (1971) , is
one of the better books for suggestions on how to blend process and
content into one*s teaching style. Wyatt (1972), has outlined a
course in process skills which, like Mosher and Sprinthall* s, involves
learners from the very beginning in an experiential fashion. Her
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course, however, unlike the other authors, focuses on process in an
almost chemically pure way. Students learn how to be aware of five
basic process events while interacting with each other. They have
the opportunity to focus awareness on these events so that they can
experience the frequently dramatic outcomes of a shift in focus from
content to process.
The final step of this module would be enabling students to
use their process skills in a practicum setting and to receive feed-
back on their effectiveness. An alternative would be to rotate group
leadership in a group of peers and to receive feedback from them.
4. Infra-Rational Value Sources . Cognitive-developmentalists
continue to over-simplify the influence of cognitive processes on a
person's actions. Contrary to the platonists' contention, to know
the good is not necessarily to do it. This module would acquaint the
prospective teacher with some psychological attempts to explain, from
below as it were, the gap between knowing and doing. Beginning with
Freud's explanation of the development of the superego or conscience,
it would explore Jung' s and Neumann' s theory of socialization and the
development of the shadow and the persona and the integration of
conscious and unconscious processes in the self . In addition it would
survey more recent conceptualizations of non—rational motivating
forces and complexes such as Berne's Parent, Adult, and Child; and
Perl's Gestalt polarity theory and his Top Dog, Underdog characters.
These various theoretical constructs would serve as a backdrop
for the students 'own exploration of the hidden motivational
forces
that, to a large extent, influence their moral actions. Of
particular
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value in this experiential segment would be the use of guided fanta-
sies, Gestalt "dream work", role-playing, art, and dance. There are
a myriad such exercises described in books by Assagioli (1971, 1974),
Sevens (1971), Hall (1976), Peris, Hefferline and Goodman (1951), and
others.
To achieve at least the beginning of a personal synthesis
between cognitive and affective influences on one's actions, students
would be encouraged to reflect (perhaps in a journal and/or by using
objective measures on themselves, such as Rest's Defining Issues Test ),
on how well they coordinate their cognitive conceptions and their
"gut reactions." For example, they may discover that, though they
recognize and appreciate principled moral thinking, their emotional
reactions derive from a preconventional level. When making a real
moral choice, one may act out of fear (Stage 1) or for personal advan-
tage (Stage 2) even whilo recognizing the superiority of moral
reasoning at a higher level. Nor does this necessarily brand such a
person as a hypocrite. There may be powerful familial and environ-
mental structures reinforcing such patterns of behavior on an
habitual or pre-conscious level. Appreciating higher levels of
reasoning is one way (possibly a necessary but not sufficient cause)
of changing moral behavior. However, a direct analysis and confron-
tation with these habits themselves using, for example, Weinstein's
Trumpet or Assagioli' s stages of the will also seems necessary to
convert thought into reasonable and responsible action.
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5. Super-Rational Value Sources , The infra-rational value
sources operate from below, # both in relation to the level of con-
sciousness and awareness and in regard to lower moral stages. Super-
rational value sources exert their influence from above both in the
sense of furnishing motivation for moral action that logic cannot
provide and in the sense of emanating from a higher level of conscious-
ness. Some have celled this the realm of the transcendent or the
transpersonal. Traditionally that terminology has been associated
with God, mysticism end prayer. More recently psychologists such as
Maslow and Assagioli have used it in reference to the apex of the
human personality which exists in relationship to ultimate meaning
and Being. As psychologists they have rightfully stopped short of
affirming the existence of or of attempting to define what sort of
Reality would satisfy this human aspiration for meaning and motivate
moral action.
This module would expose the aspiring teacher to some of the
work of transpersonal psychologists particularly as they refer to
motives for action. As we saw in Chapter three, moral judgment like
logic, cannot justify itself by its own rules of procedure but must
fall back on "first principles" which are intuitive rather than logical
*" Below" should not necessarily be understood here as
"inferior" but rather as lower on Maslow' s hierarchy of needs, e.g.,
goods necessary for self preservation, or as derived from the
rich
soil of the unconscious. Genuine personal and moral development
cannot mean transcending these foundations of the person, (that
would
be angelism rather than humanism), but rather synthesizing them.
There will always be a polar tension between the rational
and the
infra-rational, nor is one reducible to the other, but
dialogue
between the two cannot help enriching the entire person.
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(the medieval synderesis) and self-justifying. In the peak of mysticel
experience, meaning and value coincide in a synoptic, intuitive grasp
of reality which may (or may not) become incarnated in a Way around
which the person organizes his or her life. We have called these spir-
itual or meta-ethical values. They carry with them religious (or semi-
religious) and moral overtones.
Students would familiarize themselves with the systems of such
men as James, Jung, Maslow, Neumann, and Assagioli. Of particular
value because of their attempt to synthesize the goals of psychology,
education and various spiritual disciplines are the works of Naranjo
and Ornstein, (Naranjo and Omstein, 1971, Naranjo, 1972, Orstein,
1972).
In keeping with the experiential orientation of the curriculum,
the learners would, in addition, participate in exercises designed to
activate their own intuitive facilities and to relate them to their
Way of life. Again there are a multitude of techniques which could be
employed. Among them are Benson’s relaxation response (1975),
Assagioli 1 s (1971), spiritual psycho-synthesis techniques, the Arica
psychocallisthenics and meditative exercises as well as more tradi-
tional "religious” exercises derived from Zen Sufism, etc.
Brian
Hall’s The Development of Consciousness (1975), would be helpful
here
because it combines exercises which attempt to synthesize
spiritual
and moral values and because it has a developmental
orientation.
Conclusion . This curriculum aims at a threefold expansion
for the teacher-aspirants. Hopefully they will have
expanded their
awareness of both the heights and depths of their own
personalities
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by experiencing more of their subliminal or unconscious power and
motivation along with their teleological orientation toward a source
of meaning beyond their conscious selves. Secondly their thinking will
have become more critical, self-aware and better able to deal with the
complexities and dilemmas of modern life. Thirdly they would have
begun to integrate the thinking, feeling and acting facets of their
personalities and to experience themselves acting more as wholes than
as parts in opposition to each other. This is the highest aim of
education and as teachers they can play an integral part in the
development of the human species.
APPENDIX
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The Effect of a Moral Development Workshop
Table 1:* Mean percentage scores of DIT pre-test
data at each stage as used in initial chi-square
I
Stage 2 3 4 5A 5B 6 A M P
experimental 4.58 13.88 23.88 26.52 14.02 6.52 3.74 6.80 47.08
control
group one 7.63 9.58 33.61 23.74 7.77 7.08 6.80 3.74 38.61
control
group two 4.16 14.58 17.63 27.91 15.55 9.30 4.16 6.66 52.77
chi-square = 5*80 n.s.
* All data in this Appendix provided by Piwko (1974)
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Table 2: Mean ”P" percentage scores and standard
deviations of pre and post-test DTT for all three groups
EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL ONE CONTROL TWO
PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST
MEAN 44.72 52.77 45.55 47.08 39.44 38.61
SD 10.42 10.52 13.95 13.03 14.27 16.34
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Table 3: Planned comparisons of pre
and post mean "P" percentage scores
Source SS df MS F
Between 1636.39 5 — —
experimental pre vs post 381.19 1 381.19 6.890*
control one pre vs post 4.05 1 4.05 .073
control two pre vs post 23.77 1 23.77 .429
exp and cont 1 vs cont 2 1168.07 1 1168.07 3.560
residual 59.31 1 59.31 .309
Error for repeated measures 1827.19 33 55.37
Error for non-repeated
measures 10832.98 33 328.27
.05

POST
-TEST
The Effect of a Moral Development Workshop
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